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Stubborn and Rebellious Children: Liability of
Public Officials for Detention of Children in
Jails?
Mark Soler
Michael J. Dale
Kathleen Flake*
t

Stubborn children, runaways, common night walkers, both male and female,
common railers and brawlers, persons who with offensive and disorderly act or
language accost or annoy persons of the opposite sex, lewd, wanton and
lascivious persons in speech or behavior, idle and disorderly persons,
prostitutes, disturbers of the peace, keepers of noisy and disorderly houses and
persons guilty of indecent exposure may be punished by imprisonment in a
house of correction for not more than six months or by a fine of not more than
two hundred dollars, or by both such fine and imprisonment.
Mass. GEN.LAWSANN.ch. 272, $! 53 (West 1970) (amended 1973).
If a man have a stubborn and rebellious son, which will not obey the voice of
his father, or the voice of his mother, and that, when they have chastened him,
will not hearken unto them; then shall his father and his mother lay hold on
him, and bring him out unto the elders of his city, and unto the gate of his
place; and they shall say unto the elders of his city, This our son is stubborn
and rebellious, he will not obey our voice; he is a glutton, and a drunkard. And
all the men of his city shall stone him with stones, that he die; so shalt thou
put evil away from among you; and all Isreal shall hear, and fear.
Deuteronomy 21:18-21 (King James).
* Mark Soler is director and Michael J. Dale is former director of the Juvenile Justice Legal Advocacy Project, a project of the Youth Law Center, San Francisco, California. Kathleen Flake, a graduate of the University of Utah College of Law, has worked
with the Project as a legal intern.
The Juvenile Justice Legal Advocacy Project is a public interest law project operating under a grant from the Office of Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention
(OJJDP) of the Law Enforcement Assistance Administration of the United States Department of Justice. The project provides a comprehensive range of legal advocacy services to national and local advocate organizations working to implement the Juvenile
Justice and Delinquency Prevention Act of 1974, 42 U.S.C. $8 5601-5751 (1976). The
project also provides back-up support to local attorneys who are engaged in youth advocacy work, and provides direct legal assistance in the form of legislative, administrative
and litigant advocacy.
This article was prepared under Grant #78-JS-AX-0073 from the Office of Juvenile
Justice and Delinquency Prevention, Law Enforcement Assistance Administration, U.S.
Department of Justice. A portion of this article is based upon research and pleadings
done by attorneys at the National Juvenile Law Center in Saint Louis, Missouri. Points
of view or opinions in this article are those of the authors and do not necessarily represent the official position or policies of the U.S. Department of Justice.
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Each year thousands of children are confined in adult jails
throughout the United States. Although the exact number of
children confined is difficult to determine, some authorities
place the figure as high as 500,000 per year.' In 1970, a limited
survey by the National Jail Census reported that on March 15,
1970, some 7,800 children were confined in adult jails in the
United States?
The massive confinement of children in adult jails is a longstanding practice. In 1869, for example, investigators for the Illinois Board of State Commissioners of Public Charities inspected
seventy-eight jails in Illinois. They found 511 inmates, ninetyeight of whom were children under the age of sixteen? They described the Cook County jail as follows:
The jail is so dark that is is necessary to keep the gas burning
in the corridors both day and night. The cells are filthy and
full of vermin . . this effort of promiscuous herding together
of old and young, innocent and guilty, convicts, suspected persons and witnesses, male and female, is to make the county
prison a school of vice. In such an atmosphere purity itself
could not escape ~ontamination.~

.

More than 100 years later, a federal judge made similar observations concerning the conditions in the jail in Lucas County,
Ohio:
[Wlhen the total picture of confinement in the Lucas County
Jail is examined, what appears is confinement in cramped and
overcrowded quarters, lightless, airless, damp and filthy with
leaking water and human wastes, slow starvation, deprivation
of most human contacts, except with others in the same subhuman state, no exercise or recreation, little if any medical attention, no attempt at rehabilitation, and for those who in despair or frustration lash out a t their surroundings, confine1. R. SARRI,UNDER
LOCKAND KEY,JUVENILES
IN JAILSAND DETENTION
5 (1974).
2. The survey was limited to locally administeredjails with authority to confine persons for 48 hours or more. The survey did not include federal and state prisons or other
correctional institutions; jails in Connecticut, Delaware, and Rhode Island (where jails
are administered by state, not local, authorities); and drunk tanks and lockups that detain individuals for fewer than 48 hours. NATIONAL
CRIMINAL
JUSTICEINFORMATION
AND
STATISTICS
SERVICE,
LAWENFORCEMENT
ASSISTANCE
ADMINISTRATION,
U.S. DEP'TOF JUSncE, 1970 NATIONAL
A REPORT
ON THE NATION'S
LOCAL
JAILSAND TYPES
OF
JAILCENSUS,
INMATES
1 (1971).
3. A. F'LATT,
THECHILDSAYERS118 (2d ed. 1977).
4. Id. at 119.
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ment, stripped of clothing and every last vestige of humanity,
in a sort of oubliette.=

As in other states: detention of juveniles in adult jails is
illegal in Utah. State law generally requires that juveniles be detained in facilities separate and distinct from adult jails.'
In addition, the federal Juvenile Justice and Delinquency
Prevention Act8 requires states to develop state plans for implementation of the Act which will ensure that juveniles who are
5. Baker v. Hamilton, 345 F. Supp. 345,352 (W.D. Ky. 1972) (quoting Jones v. Wittenberg, 323 F. Supp. 93, 99 (N.D. Ohio 1971).
6. Attorneys for the Juvenile Justice Legal Advocacy Project focus their work primarily on six states: Colorado, New Mexico, North Carolina, Oregon, Utah, and Washington. The laws in these six states differ somewhat in terms of statutory liability and
immunity of public officials. These differences are representative of those among other
states. In this Article, the text will focus on Utah law, with references to the laws of the
other states for comparative purposes.
7. The Utah Juvenile Court Act, UTAHCODEANN. 78-3a-30(3) (1953), specifically
provides:
No child under the age of 16 may be confined in a jail, lockup or other place
for adult detention. The provisions of section 55-10-49 remain in full force and
effect. . . .
Section 55-1la-1 provides:
Children under the age of sixteen years, who are apprehended by any officer or
are brought before any court for examination under any of the provisions of
this chapter, shall not be confined in the jails, lockups or police cells used for
ordinary criminals or persons charged with crime nor shall they be confined in
the state youth development center.
UTAHCODEANN.§ 55-lla-1 (Supp. 1979) (previously designated 55-10-49).
The State of Washington prohibits the detention of any child under 16 years of age
in a jail, lockup, or police station. The child may be held in a detention facility separate
from a jail. WASH.REV.CODEANN.$ 13.04.115 (1962).
The basic rule in Colorado is that children under the age of 14 may not be held in
jails used for the confinement of adults. Children over the age of 14 may not be held in
jails used for adults except pursuant to court order. The exception may be invoked only
where "no other suitable place of confinement is available." COLO.REV.STAT. 19-2lO3(6)(a) (1978).
In New Mexico, the Children's Code states that no child alleged to be in need of
supervision or neglected may be held in jail. N.M. STAT.ANN. 32-1-25 (E)(1978). Alleged juvenile delinquents may only be held in jail "in a room totally separate and removed from incarcerated adults." Id. § 32-1-25(C).
North Carolina's current statute provides that, until 1983, alleged status offenders
and delinquents may be held in jails with holdover facilities for juveniles as long as there
is both sight and sound separation from adults. N.C. GEN.STAT.$ 7A-576 (Supp. 1979).
After this date no children can be held in detention in jails. Id. § 7A-576(c).
Unlike the other states cited, Oregon allows all classes of juveniles-dependent, status offenders, and delinquents-14 years of age or over to be placed in an adult detention facility in a separate room screened from sight and sound of adult detainees under
circumstances where a suitable juvenile detention facility is not available. OR. REV.STAT.
419.575 (1977).
8. 42 U.S.C. §§ 5601-5751 (1976).
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charged with or have committed offenses that would not be
criminal if committed by an adult (status offenders), and such
nonoffenders as dependent and neglected children, are not
placed in secure facilities at all.@ These plans must also provide
that juveniles alleged or found to be delinquent, status offenders, or nonoffenders may not be detained in any institution or
facility where they have regular contact with adults charged
with or convicted of crimes.1°
Despite these clear mandates, substantial numbers of
juveniles are regularly detained in adult jails in Utah. In July,
1976, the John Howard Association estimated that more than
1,100 juveniles had been detained in Utah adult jails during the
previous year." A thirty day survey by the Community Research
Forum in 1979 confirmed that, at least in rural areas, juveniles
continue to be detained in adult jails on a regular basis.12
This Article will discuss the nature and extent of the legal
liability local and state officials in Utah may incur for detaining
juveniles in adult jails. For purposes of comparison, reference
will be made to five other states? This Article will specifically
9. Id. 5 5633(a)(12).
10. Id. 5 5633(a)(13). In addition, the Federal Juvenile Delinquency Act, 18 U.S.C.
45 5031-5037 (1976), which applies to juveniles prosecuted in federal courts, provides:
A juvenile alleged to be delinquent may be detained only in a juvenile facility
or such other suitable place as the Attorney General may designate. Whenever
possible, detention shall be in a foster home or cummunity based facility located in or near his home community. The Attorney General shall not came
any juvenile alleged to be delinquent to be detained or confined in any institution in which the juvenile has regular contact with adult persons convicted
of a crime or waiting trial on criminal charges. Insofar as possible, alleged
delinquents shall be kept separate from adjudicated delinquents. Every juvenile in custody shall be provided with adequate food, heat, light, sanitary facilities, bedding, clothing, recreation, education, and medical care, including necessary psychiatric, psychological, or other care and treatment.
Id. 5 5035 (emphasis added).
11. JOHN
HOWARD
ASSOCIATION,
UNIFIEDCORRECTIONS
STUDY
OF STATE
OF UTAH:FINAL REPORT.
A STUDY
FOR THE SOCIAL
SERVICES
STUDY
COMMITTEE
OF THE LEGISLATURE
OF
THE STATE
OF UTAH
88 (1976). In 1977 in Colorado, 4,541 juveniles were held in jails. Of
this number, 3,318 were held in jails lacking adequate separation from adults. DIVISION
OF CRIMINAL
JUSTICE,
STATEOF COLORADO,
1980 JUVENILE
JUSTICE
AND DELINQUENCY
PREVENTION PLAN383 (1979). In 1977 in North Carolina, 2,644 juveniles were held in adult
jails. An additional 4,002 were held in juvenile detention facilities. JUVENILECODEREVISION COMMIT~EE,
1979 REPORT,
374-75 (1979).
12. COMMUNITY
RESEARCH
FORUM,
PRELIMINARY
REPORTTO THE UTAHSTATEJUVENILE JUSTICE
ADVISORY
GROUP:REMOVAL
OF JUVENILES
FROM ADULT
JAILSIN RURAL
UTAH
(1979).
13. These states are Colorado, New Mexico, North Carolina, Oregon, and Washington. See note 6 supra.
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discuss the injuries suffered by children detained in adult jails,
the bases for liability under state and federal law of local and
state officials who have legal responsibility for juveniles detained
in jails, and the immunity and indemnification provisions applicable to such local and state officials. Finally, this Article will
summarize the relevant public policy considerations and draw
conclusions as to the liability of local and state officials who illegally detain juveniles in adult jails.

Virtually every national organization concerned with law enforcement and the judicial system-including the American Bar
Association, the Institute for Judicial Administration, the National Advisory Commission on Law Enforcement, the National
Council on Crime and Delinquency, and the National Sheriffs'
Association- has recommended standards that prohibit the jailing of children. This near unanimous censure of the jailing of
children stems from the conclusion that such a practice harms
the very persons the juvenile justice system is designed to protect and assist. A Senate subcommittee concluded that
"[r]egardless of the reasons that might be brought forth to justify jailing juveniles, the practice is destructive for the child who
is incarcerated and dangerous for the community that permits
[it]."I4
Incarcerating children harms them in several ways. The
most widely recognized harm is the physical and sexual abuse
such children suffer at the hands of $adultsin the same facility.
The cases of assault and rape of jailed juveniles are too numerous to list and too common to be denied. Even short term or
pretrial detention in an adult jail exposes male and female
juveniles not only to sexual assault and exploitation but to physical injury as well. One authority describes the plight of juveniles
in some jails in the following terms:
Most of the children in these jails have done nothing, yet they
are subjected to the cruelest of abuses. They are confined in
overcrowded facilities, forced to perform brutal exercise routines, punished by beatings by staff and peers, put in isolation,
and whipped. They have their heads held under water in toi14. Detention and Jailing of Juveniles: Hearings Before the Subcomm. to Investigate Juvenile Delinquency of the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 93d Cong., 1st Seas.
(1973).
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lets. They are raped by both s M and peers, gassed in their
cells, and sometimes stomped or beaten to death by adult prisoners. A number of youths not killed by others end up killing
themsel~es.'~

Often local officials isolate the child from contact with
others in an attempt to protect him from attack by adult detainees. However, such well-meaning measures may themselves be
harmful to the child. Dr. Joseph R. Noshpitz, past president of
the American Association for Children's Residential Centers and
Secretary of the American Academy of Child Psychiatry, has
noted that placing juveniles in jail often causes serious emotional distress and even illness:
[Elxtended isolation of a youngster exposes him to conditions
equivalent to "sensory deprivation.'' This is a state of affairs
which will cause a normal adult to begin experiencing psychotic-like symptoms, and will push a troubled person in the direction of serious emotional illness.
What is true in this case for adults is of even greater concern with children and adolescents. Youngsters are in general
more vulnerable to emotional pressure than mature adults; isolation is a condition of extraordinarily severe phychic stress;
the resultant impact on the mental health of the individual exposed to such stress will always be serious, and can occasionally be disastrous.16

Jails that were constructed to accommodate adults who
have committed criminal acts cannot provide an environment
suitable for the care and detention of delinquents or status offenders. Adult detention facilities do not take into account the
child's perception of time and space or his naivete regarding the
purpose and duration of his stay in a locked facility. The lack of
sensory stimuli, extended periods of absolute silence or outbreaks of hostility, foul odors and public commodes, as well as
inactivity and empty time constitute an intolerable environment
for a child.
The juvenile offender confined with adults is exposed to a
society that encourages his delinquent behavior, schools him in
sophisticated criminal techniques, and provides him with criminal contacts. High recidivism rates belie the widespread belief
15. BARTOLLAS
& MILLER, ?kE JUVENILE OFFENDER:CONTROL,CORRECTION
AND

TREATMENT 212 (1978).
16. Lollis v. New York Stat. Dep't of Social Servs., 322 F. Supp. 473,481 (S.D.N.Y.
1970).
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that the unpleasant experience of incarceration will have a
deterrant effect on the child's future delinquent acts. To the
contrary, "[ilf a youngster is made to feel like a prisoner, then
he will soon begin to behave like a prisoner, assuming all the
attributes and characteristics which he has learned from fellow
inmates and from previous exposure to the media.'"'
Being treated like a prisoner also reinforces the delinquent
or truant child's negative self-image. It confirms what many delinquent children already suspect about their lack of social acceptance and self-worth. In its Standards and Guides for the
Detention of Children and Youth, the National Council on
Crime and Delinquency concluded:
The case against the uie of jails for children rests upon the fact
that youngsters of juvenile court age are still in the process of
development and are still subject to change, however large they
may be physically or however sophisticated their behavior. To
place them behind bars at a time when the whole world seems
to turn against them, and belief in themselves is shattered or
distorted merely confirms the criminal role in which they see
themselves. Jailing delinquent youngsters plays directly into
their hands by giving them delinquency status among their
peers. If they resent being treated like confirmed adult
criminals, they may-and
often do-strike back violently
against society after release. The public tends to ignore that
every youngster placed behind bars will return to the society
which placed him there?

Additionally, incarceration carries with it a criminal stigma. A
community seldom has higher regard for those in jail than it
does for the jail itself. This is especially detrimental to a youth
from a rural or less sophisticated small community.
The juvenile justice system was expressly created to remove
children from the punitive forces of the criminal justice system.
The practice of jailing juveniles, however, directly contravenes
this purpose. Exposing a boy or girl to the punitive conditions of
jail may jeopardize his or her emotional and physical well-being
and may handicap future rehabilitation efforts.
17. Komisaruk, Psychiatric Issues in the Incarceration of Juveniles, 21 J w . COURT

J. 117,118 (1971).
18. NATIONAL
COUNCIL
ON CFUME
AND DELINQUENCY, STANDARDS
AND GUIDES
FOR THE
DETENTION
OF CHILDREN
AND YOUTH13 (2d ed. 1961).
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Local and state officials who detain juveniles in adult jails
may incur liability in two ways. First, officials who authorize or
allow such detention in derogation of statute, or who fail to prevent or terminate such detention when under a legal duty to do
so, may incur liability from the very fact that the detention occurs. Second, such officials may incur liability for the physical or
mental injuries sustained by juveniles as a result of their being
jailed with adults. Such liability may be incurred under both
federal and state law. However, before discussing the legal theories under which state and local officials can be held liable for
detaining juveniles in adult jails, a discussion regarding which
state and local officials are legally responsible for such detentions is essential.

A. Statutory Obligations of Local and State Officials
1. County commissioners

In Utah, the primary responsibility for providing for
juveniles detained prior to legal proceedings rests upon the
county commissioners.1s This obligation includes the development of detention homes or other facilities in compliance with
the department of social services' minimum detention standards.
If the county commissioners develop their own detention facilities, they must provide "suitable premises entirely distinct and
separate from the ordinary jails, lockups or police cells."20
Like Utah,most of the other states reviewed here place the
19. UTAHCODEANN. 8 55-lla-1 (Supp. 1979) provides:
It shall be the duty of counties, with the assistance of the state department of
public welfare, to make provision for the custody and detention of such children and other children under the age of eighteen years who shall be in need of
detention care prior to their trial or examination or while awaiting assignment
to a home or facility in such places as shall meet minimum standards of detention care to be established by the state department of public welfare either by
arrangement with some person or society willing to undertake the responsibility of such temporary custody or detention on such terms as may be agreed
upon, or by providing suitable premises entirely distinct and separate from the
ordinary jails, lockups or police cells.
Furthermore, the next section specifically designates the county commissioners as the
individuals responsible for detention facilities. UTAHCODEANN. 5 55-11a-2 (Supp. 1979).
20. UTAHCODEANN. 5 55-11a-2 (Supp. 1979). UTAHCODEANN. 5 55-11a-3 (Supp.
1979) provides that county commissioners may also contract with other counties for detention services.
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primary responsibility for providing juvenile detention facilities
on the county."' Two exceptions are Colorado, which places the
entire responsibility on the Department of institution^,^^ and
Oregon, which places ultimate responsibility for facilities' personnel on the juvenile court judge.%' The responsibility to provide juvenile detention facilities includes the construction, maintenance, and stafling of the facilities." In New Mexico and
North Carolina the facilities must comply with minimum standards set by a state agency.$6

2. Sheriffs
Juveniles brought to adult jails generally fall within the custody of the local sheriffs, who therefore have immediate responsibility for their welfare and the conditions of their detention.'.
21. See N.M. STAT.ANN. 33-6-1 (1978) (county commissioners obligated to establish and equip "juvenile detention homes"); N.C. GEN. STAT. $ 153A-217(5) (1978)
(county commissioners responsible to construct, maintain, and operate "local confinement facilities," which include "juvenile detention home[s]"); WASH.REV.CODEANN.§§
13.04.135, 13.16.030 (1962)(construction and maintenance of separate detention facilities
for juveniles a mandatory county function). Occasionally counties are assisted by other
agencies. Under recent legislation in North Carolina, for example, the Department of
Human Resources has developed regional detention facilities to augment those operated
by counties. N.C. GEN.STAT. 134A-37 (Supp. 1979).
22. COLO.REV.STAT.$8 19-8-117 to 120 (1978). The county commissioners do have
responsibility, however, for those juveniles held in adult jails when "no other suitable
place of confinement is available." Id. § 19-2-103(6).
23. OR. REV. STAT. 419.612(1) (1977). Counties are authorized, however, to construct and operate detention facilities for dependent children as well as delinquents. The
board of county commissioners is also empowered to build local correctional facilities
that may house pre-trial detainees including juveniles. Id. $8 169.010, .150, .220, 419.575.
24. New Mexico, for example, makes counties responsible for obtaining federal
funds for juvenile detention facilities, contracting to build the facilities, maintaining the
facilities, making rules for the administration of the facilities, and appointing and training the staff. N.M. STAT.ANN.§ 32-1-6 (1978). In Washington, the duty of maintaining
such facilities includes the hiring of an adequate staff and "furnishing suitable food,
clothing and recreational facilities for dependent, delinquent and wayward children."
WASH.REV.CODE.ANN.$9 13.16.040, .050 (1962).
25. Juvenile detention facility standards in New Mexico are set by the New Mexico
Criminal Justice Department. N.M. STAT.ANN.$8 33-6-3, -4, -5, -6, -10. In North Carolina, they are set by the Department of Human Resources. N.C. GEN.STAT.$ 7A-576(b)
(Supp. 1979). Should a child be detained in an adult jail, the jail must be one containing
a juvenile holdover facility and must also be approved by the Department of Human
Resources. Id. 7A-576(b).
26. See UTAHCODEANN.$8 78-3a-29 to 30 (1953). See also COLO.REV.STAT.$5 3010-501, -511, -514 (1977); N.M. STAT.ANN. 33-3-1 (1978); OR. REV.STAT.$8 169.140,
.220, .320 (1977). The county sheriff in North Carolina may appoint someone besides
himself to operate or "keep" the jail, if he so desires. Alternatively, he may request the
county commissioners to appoint some other person to operate the jail. N.C. GEN.STAT.
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Utah law prohibits a sheriff taking a juvenile into custody from
detaining him any longer than is reasonably necessary to obtain
his name, age, residence, and ather necessary information and to
contact his parents, guardian, or custodian. After the sheriff has
obtained such information, he must either release the juvenile or
take him without unnecessary delay to the court or to a place of
detention designated by the court." In all instances when the
youth is not released, the sheriff must notify the parents or
guardian of the right to a prompt hearing to determine the justification for any further detenti~n.'~
3. Departments of social services

The Division of Family Services, as part of the Utah Department of Social Services, has overall responsibility for individual and family services in the state, including services for delinquent children.'@ The division also has authority to develop
and operate community centers for services, such as group home
care, and to rent, purchase, or build facilities to carry out the
functions of such centers.s0
The Department of Social Services, acting through the Division of Family Services, is specifically authorized to assist counties in establishing detention centerss1and is directed to develop
detention facilities where the counties have not provided adequate facilities. To enable the department to carry out this mandate, the legislature has authorized it to approve payment by the
8 162-22 (1978). In Washington, however, where juveniles may not be held in jails or
REV.
other adult detention facilities, sheriffs have no responsibility for them. WASH.
CODEANN. $8 70.48.020(1), (2), (4), .090 (Supp. 1978).
27. Specifically, Utah law states:
A sheriff, warden, or other official in charge of a jail or other facility for the
detention of adult offenders or persons charged with crime, shall immediately
notify the juvenile court when a child who is or appears to be under eighteen
years of age is received a t the facility, and shall make arrangements for the
transfer of the child to a detention facility, unless otherwise ordered by the
juvenile court. . . .
UTAHCODEANN. 78-3a-31 (1953).
A similar responsibility exists under New Mexico law, which, through its Children's
Code, specifically charges sheriffs to inform the court within four working days (or 48
consecutive hours, if shorter) whenever an individual who appears to be under eighteen
is received a t the jail. N.M. STAT.ANN. $ 32-1-25(F) (1978).
28. UTAHCODEANN. 78-3a-30 (1953).
29. The basic responsibilities of the Division are set forth in UTAHCODEANN. 8 5515b-6 (1953 & Supp. 1979).
30. Id. 8 55-15b-14.
31. Id. $ 55-lla-4 (Supp. 1979).
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state of up to fifty percent of the total net expenditure for capital inprovements and operation and maintenance of detention
facilities by the counties, and to assist the counties in developing
plans to provide suitable housing and other physical facilities to
meet their detention requirementd2
The legislative response in New Mexico has been entirely
different. In 1978, the legislature created the detention facility
grant fund, under which the state criminal justice department
was given the authority to approve applications for grants to
counties and municipalities for the purpose of constructing new
facilities or modifying existing facilities to create sight and
sound separation of juveniles from adults."
The Department of Human Resources, its Secretary, and
the Social Services Commission in North Carolina have substantial responsibilities regarding local confinement facilities. The
department provides technical assistance, develops minimum
standards for construction and operation, visits and inspects the
facilities semi-annually, and makes written report^.^' All standards for the operation of the facilities must be approved by the
. ~ ~ secretary is responsible for
commission and the G o v e r n ~ rThe
corrective action in the event an inspection discloses that a facility fails to meet minimum standards." The department also approves holdover facilities for juveniles located in adult jails and
sets standards for the operation of juvenile detention homes.s7
Most importantly, however, the North Carolina Department of
Human Services is responsible for the development and operation of regional juvenile detention facilities, and the development of a subsidy program for county juvenile detention
homes.38
4. Juvenile court judges

In most states juvenile court judges exercise exclusive original jurisdiction over all juveniles who violate federal, state, or
32. Id. $8 55-11a-4 to -6.
33. N.M. STAT.ANN.5 32-2B-1 to 5 (Supp. 1978). The department of social services
(Human Services Dep't) has no responsibility for detention care in New Mexico.
34. N.C. GEN.STAT.5 153A-220 (1978). Local confinement facilities include juvenile
detention homes. Id. 3 153A-217(5).
35. Id. 5 153A-221(~).
36. Id. 5 153A-223.
37. Id. 5 7A-576(b) (Supp. 1979).
38. Id. 5 134A-36 to 37.
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local law? In Utah, the Board of Juvenile Court Judges, comprised of all the state's juvenile court judges, is statutorily directed to consider and deal with problems that arise in connection with the operation of the juvenile courts in any district2O In
some other states, the judiciary actually manages the juvenile
detention facilities. In Washington, for instance, the superior
court judges in the larger counties either appoint a board of
managers to administer detention services for those youth under
juvenile court jurisdiction or transfer this responsibility to the
county executive." In Oregon, the juvenile court judges hire
counselors for the county juvenile department as well as a director of the department to administer the juvenile detention
fa~ilities.'~

B. Liability Under Federal Law
1. Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention Act

The Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention Act" is
primarily a funding statute. States receive federal funds to implement the goals of the Act, but become ineligible for continued
funding if they fail to comply within a specified time period.44
The Act does not specifically provide for private lawsuits by aggrieved individuals, e.g., individual status offenders detained in
secure facilities, or individual juveniles incarcerated in adult
jails.
Recent case law, however, indicates that individual juveniles
may be able to maintain private causes of action under the Act.
United States SuIn Cannon v. University of Chicago,'"he
preme Court considered the question of whether an aggrieved
individual can maintain a private cause of action under section
901(a) of Title IX of the Education Amendments of 1972? Section 901 provides that no person shall be subjected to discrimi39. See, e-g., COLO.REV.STAT.5 19-1-104 (1978); N.M. STAT.ANN.5 32-1-9 (1978);
OR.REV.STAT.$ 419.476(1) (1977); UTAHCODEANN.5 78-3a-16 (1973); WASH.REV.CODE
ANN.$ 13.04.030 (1962).
40. UTAHCODEANN.$ 78-3a-10 (1973).
41. WASH.REV.CODEANN.$5 13.20.010-.50 (1962).
42. OR. REV.STAT.$5 419.604-.616 (1977).
43. 42 U.S.C. $5 5601-5751 (1976). See notes 8-10 and accompanying text supra.
44. 42 U.S.C. $ 5633(a), (c). The states of Colorado, New Mexico, North Carolina,
Oregon, Utah, and Washington receive funding under the Act.
45. 441 U S . 677 (1979).
46. 20 U.S.C. $ 1681 (1976).
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nation on the basis of sex under any education program or activity receiving federal financial assistance. Plaintiff Geraldine
Cannon claimed that she had been denied admission to two
medical schools receiving federal assistance because of her sex
and filed suit against the schools for violation of section 901.
Like the Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention Act,
Title IX is primarily designed as a funding statute and contains
no express authorization of private lawsuits for violations of the
law. Nevertheless, the Supreme Court ruled that a statute may
be construed to provide a private remedy if four specific factors
are satisfied:
"In determining whether a private remedy is implicit in a statute not expressly providing one, several factors are relevant.
First, is the plaintiff 'one of the class for whose especial benefit the statute was enacted,'-that is, does the statute create a
federal right in favor of the plaintifl Second, is there any indication of legislative intent, explicit or implicit, either to create such a remedy or to deny one? Third, is it consistent with
the underlying purposes of the legislative schnme to imply
such a remedy for the plaintifl And finally, is the cause of
action one traditionally relegated to state law, in a n area basically the concern of the States, so that it would be inappropriate to infer a cause of action based solely on federal law?"47

The Supreme Court concluded that because these four factors
were satisfied, Title IX should be construed to allow private
lawsuits.
The Court's use of these four factors and its discussion in
the Cannon opinion strongly indicate that aggrieved individuals
can maintain private causes of action under the Juvenile Justice
and Delinquency Prevention Act. In terms of these four factors,
it is evident, first, that juveniles confined in adult jails are "of
the class for whose especial benefit the statute was enacted."
One of the primary provisions of the Act" specifically prohibits
the incarceration of juveniles in jails with adults. The second
and third factors require an analysis of the legislative history of
the Act. The legislative history is replete with references concerning the importance of prohibiting the detention of juveniles
in adult jails. Indeed, much of the legislative history describes
47. 441 U.S. at 688 n.9 (emphasis added)(quoting Cort v. Ash, 422 U.S. 66, 78
(1975)) (citations omitted).
48. 42 U.S.C. $ 5633(a)(13) (1976).
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the operative provisions of the Act in terms of enforceable civil
rights. Thus, in introducing S. 3146 (the predecessor of S. 821,
which became the Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention
Act), Senator Bayh declared that the bill contained "an absolute
prohibition" against detention or confinement of children in institutions with adults." During floor debate on the Act in 1974,
Senator Bayh declared that Congress was "establishing a national standard for due process in the system of juvenile justice"
through the legislation." In urging enactment of the provisions
of the Federal Juvenile Delinquency Act that were passed as
amendments to the Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention Act and which prohibit confinement of juveniles in jails
with adults, Senator Kennedy stated that the legislation enacted
"the guarantee of basic rights to detained juveniles.'"l
With respect to the fourth factor, it may be argued that the
welfare and protection of juveniles is traditionally a matter for
state law, and thus it may be inappropriate to infer a cause of
action under federal law. Nevertheless, the welfare of juveniles is
not solely a matter of state concern. Indeed, federal legislation
has operated in this area for more than sixty years, including the
Children's Bureau Act of 1912:2 the Social Security Act of
1935,'3 The Child Health Act of 1967,Mthe Child Nutrition Act
of 1966y the Crippled Children Services Act,Wthe Juvenile Delinquency Prevention and Control Act of 1968," the Juvenile
Delinquency and Youth Offenses Control Act of 1961," and the
Child Abuse Prevention and Treatment Act of 1974?@
In addition, the Supreme Court's decision in Cannon notes
two other reasons why a federal remedy is appropriate. First,
"[slince the Civil War, the Federal Government and the federal
courts have been the 'primary and powerful reliances' in protecting citizens against" violations of civil rightdo Second, "it is
49. 118 CONG.REC.3049 (1972) (emphasis added).
50. 120 CONG.REC.25165 (1974) (emphasis added).
51. 120 CONG.REC.25184 (1974) (emphasis added).
52. 42 U.S.C. $3 191-194 (1976).
53. Id. $$ 301-306.
54. Id. $$ 701-715, 729.
55. Id. $9 1771-1786.
.56. Id. $5 701-716.
57. Id. $ 3801.
58. Id. $5 2541-2548.
59. Id. $ 5101.
60. 441 U.S. at 708 (emphasis in original).
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the expenditure of federal funds that provides the justification
for this particular statutory prohibition. There can be no question but that this . . analysis supports the implication of a private federal remed~."~'Like Title IX, the Juvenile Justice and
Delinquency Prevention Act provides federal funds to the states
in order to foster and protect the civil rights of individuals. Accordingly, it appears likely that a private right of action also exists under the Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention Act,
thereby enabling a juvenile confined in an adult jail to sue those
responsible in federal court.62

.

2.

The right to treatment and section 1983

a. Origins and development of the right to treatment. In
recent years there has been a growing recognition by courts and
commentators that individuals involuntarily committed to institutions for treatment have a "right" to such treatment, and that
those who do not in fact receive treatment suffer a violation of
that right. The first discussion of a so-called right to treatment
. ~ Birnbaum
is generally credited to Dr. Morton B i r n b a ~ m Dr.
was particularly concerned about the unavailability of psychotherapy for mental patients committed to state hospitals for the
ostensible purpose of treatment. He proposed
that the courts under their traditional powers to protect the
constitutional rights of our citizens begin to consider the problem of whether or not a person who has been institutionalized
solely because he is sufficiently mentally ill to require institu-

-

-

61. Id. at 708-09 (emphasis added). See Cort v. Ash, 422 U.S. 66 (1975).
62. See also Coleman v. Darden, 595 F.2d 533 (10th Cir. 1979), holding that handicapped persons may not bring private lawsuits against federal agencies for alleged violations of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, although, as the court noted, "[elvery Circuit
Court of Appeals which has addressed the issue has held that a private cause of action
can be implied from the statute against the proper defendants." Id. a t 538. See, e.g.,
Leary v. Crapsey, 566 F.2d 863,865 (2d Cir. 1977); United Handicapped Fed'n v. Andre,
558 F.2d 413, 415 (8th Cir. 1977); Lloyd v. Regional Transp. Auth., 548 F.2d 1277 (7th
Cir. 1977). See also Boxall v. Sequoia Union High School Dist., 464 F. Supp. 1104, 1109
(N.D. Cal. 1979); Doe v. Marshall, 459 F. Supp. 1190, 1192 (S.D. Tex. 1978); Lora v.
Board of Educ. 456 F. Supp. 1211, 1228-30 (E.D.N.Y. 1978); Davis v. Bucher, 451 F.
Supp. 791, 797-98 (E.D. Pa. 1978); Bartels v. Biernat, 427 F. Supp. 226, 229-30 (E.D.
Va. 1976); Hairston v. Drosick,
Wis. 1977); Sites v. McKenzie, 423 F. Supp. 1190 (N.D.W.
423 F. Supp. 180 (S.D.W. Va. 1976); Cherry v. Matthews, 419 F. Supp. 922 (D.D.C.
1976); Gurmankin v. Costanza, 411 F. Supp. 982 (E.D. Pa. 1976), aff'd,556 F.2d 184 (3d
Cir. 1977). Arguably, juveniles may now sue under 42 U.S.C. $ 1983 for violations of the
statutory rights afforded them by the Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention Act.
See Maine v. Thiboutot, 100 S. Ct. 2502, 2520 (1980) (Powell, J., concurring).
63. Birnbaum, The Right to Treatment, 46 A.B.A.J. 499 (1960).
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tionalization for care and treatment actually does receive adequate medical treatment so that he may regain his health, and
therefore his liberty, as soon as possible; that the courts do this
by means of recognizing and enforcing the right to treatment;
and that the courts do this, independent of any action by any
legislature, as a necessary and overdue development of our present concept of due process of law?'

Dr. Birnbaum did not rigorously explore the constitutional bases
for the right to treatment or the limits of the substantive right.
Instead, he argued generally that "substantive due process of
law does not allow a mentally ill person who has committed no
crime to be deprived of his liberty by indefinitely institutionalizing him in a mental prison."66 He concluded that a writ of
habeas corpus should be available to test the adequacy of treatment received in an individual case.@@
In 1966 in Rouse v. Cameron,67the United States Court of
Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit became the first
federal court to recognize the right to treatment as a basis for
releasing an involuntarily committed individual. Charles Rouse,
tried on charges of carrying a dangerous weapon, was found not
guilty by reason of insanity and was committed to Saint Elizabeth's Hospital. He challenged his confinement in a habeas
corpus proceeding, claiming that his right to treatment was being violated because he had received no psychiatric treatment.@'
Chief Judge Bazelon, writing for a divided court, found that
Congress had "established a statutory 'right to treatment' in the
1964 Hospitalization of the Mentally I11 Act,"6Band remanded
the case for further proceedings to determine whether Rouse
had, in fact, received adequate treatment during his
confinement.
More noteworthy than the statutory holding in Rouse was
the court's discussion in dictum regarding the potential constitutional issues. The court stated that "[albsence of treatment
'might draw into question "the constitutionality of [this]
mandatory commitment section" ' as applied."70The court listed
64. Id. at 503.
65. Id.
66. Id.
67. 373 F.2d 451 (D.C. Cir. 1966).
68. Id. at 452.
69. Id. at 453 (emphasis in original).
70. Id. The court quoted Darnel1 v. Carmeron, 348 F.2d 64, 68 (D.C. Cir. 1965), in
which it had earlier noted that the absence of treatment might raise constitutional ques-
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several ways in which confinement without treatment might violate constitutional standards. For example, where commitment
is summary, without procedural safeguards, such commitment
may violate the individual's right to procedural due process.71 In
addition, the court noted that if Rouse had been convicted of
the crime charged he could have been confined for a maximum
of one year. At the time of the decision, however, he had been
confined for four years, with no end in sight. This differential in
periods of confinement raises not only obvious equal protection
questions, but also issues under due process of law since it depends solely on the need for treatment that allegedly was not
met.72 Finally, confinement for an indefinite period without
treatment of one found not criminally responsible may be so inhumane as to constitute "cruel and unusual p~nishment."~'
In 1971 in Wyatt v. S t i ~ k n e ythe
, ~ ~court went one step further than Rouse and held that patients involuntarily confined in
a hospital did have a constitutional right to treatment:
The patients in Bryce Hospital, for the most part, were
involuntarily committed through noncriminal procedures and
without the constitutional protections that are afforded defendants in criminal proceedings. When patients are so committed
for treatment purposes they unquestionably have a constitutional right to receive such individual treatment as will give
each of them a realistic opportunity to be cured or to improve
his or her mental condition. . . Adequate and effective treatment is constitutionally required because, absent treatment,
the hospital is transformed "into a penitentiary where one
could be held indefinitely for no convicted offense."75

.

-

-

-

-

--

--

-

-

--

-

-

-

-

tions. It also cited Dr. Birnbaum's article in the American Bar Association Journal. 373
F.2d at 453 n.6.
71. 373 F.2d at 453; see Ragsdale v. Overholser, 281 F.2d 943, 950 (D.C. Cir. 1960)
(Fahy, J., concurring).
72. 373 F.2d at 453; see Sas v. Maryland, 334 F.2d 506, 509 (4th Cir. 1964).
73. 373 F.2d at 453. See also Robinson v. California, 370 US. 660 (1962); Easter v.
District of Columbia, 361 F.2d 50 (1966). The Rouse decision provoked a considerable
amount of discussion by legal commentators. See, e.g., Bazelon, Implementing the Right
to Treatment, 36 U . CHI.L. REV.742 (1969); Symposium-The Right to Treatment, 57
GEO. L.J. 673 (1969); Note, The Nascent Right to Treatment, 53 VA. L. REV. 1134
(1967); Note, Civil Restraint, Mental Illness and the Right to Treatment, 77 YALEL.J.
87 (1967).
74. 325 F. Supp. 781 (M.D. Ala. 1971), aff'dsub nom. Wyatt v. Aderholt, 503 F.2d
1305 (5th Cir. 1974).
75. Id. at 784 (citations omitted) (quoting Ragsdale v. Overholser, 281 F.2d 943, 950
(D.C. Cir. 1960)). In contrast to Charles Rouse, who sought his release through habeas
corpus, the inmates in Wyatt brought suit under the Federal Civil Rights Act, 42 U.S.C.
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The court's decision in Wyatt, which was affirmed by the Fifth
Cir~uit,'~
generated a great deal of discussion among legal scholars,??and was followed by a number of other courts.78
While Wyatt v. Stickney was being litigated, Kenneth Donaldson, a patient in the Florida State Hospital, sued his attending physicians and the superintendent of the facility on the
grounds that he had been involuntarily confined for fifteen years
without treatment. At trial the jury awarded Donaldson $48,000.
On appeal the Fifth Circuit used the lower court's language in
Wyatt in holding that a patient has a "constitutional right to
$ 1983, for deprivation of constitutional rights.
76. Wyatt v. Aderholt, 503 F.2d 1305 (5th Cir. 1974).
77. See, e.g., Bailey & Pyfer, Deprivation of Liberty and the Right to Treatment, 7
CLEARINGHOUSE
REV.519 (1974); Birnbaum, Some Remarks on the Right to Treatment,
23 ALA.L. REV.623 (1971);Drake, Enforcing the Right to Treatment: Wyatt v. Stickney,
10 AM. CRIM.L. REV.587 (1972); Gough, The Beyond-Control Child and the Right to
Treatment: An Exercise in the Synthesis of Paradox, 16 ST. LOUISU.L.J. 182 (1971);
Hoffman & Dunn, Beyond Rouse and Wyatt: An Administrative-Law Model for Expanding and Implementing the Mental Patient's Right to Treatment, 61 VA. L. REV.
297 (1975); Schwitzgebel, Right to Treatment for the Mentally Disabled: The Need for
Realistic Standards and Objective Criteria, 8 HARV.C.R.C.L.L. REV.513 (1973); Symposium-Observations on the Right to Treatment, 10 DUQ.L. REV.553 (1972); Developments in the Law-Civil Commitment of the Mentally Ill, 87 HARV.L. REV.1190 (1974)
[hereinafter cited as Developments]; Comment, Adequate Psychiatric Treatment-A
Constitutional Right?, 19 CATH.LAW.322 (1973); Comment, Wyatt v. Stickney and the
Right of Civilly Committed Mental Patients to Adequate Treatment, 86 HARV.L. REV.
1282 (1973); Note, Guaranteeing Treatment for the Committed Mental Patient: The
Troubled Enforcement of an Elusive Right, 32 MD. L. REV.42 (1972); Comment, Reflections on the Right to Treatment, 8 NEW ENC.L. REV. 231 (1973); Note, Wyatt v.
Stickney-A Constitutional Right io Treatment for the Mentally Ill, 34 U . PI=. L. REV.
79 (1972); 27 O ~ AL.. REV.238 (1974).
78. See, e.g., In re Ballay, 482 F.2d 648, 659 (D.C. Cir. 1973); Davis v. Watkins, 384
F. Supp. 1196 (N.D. Ohio 1974); Welsch v. Likins, 373 F. Supp. 487 (D. Minn. 1974),
aff'd,550 F.2d 1122 (8th Cir. 1977); Kesselbrenner v. Anonymous, 33 N.Y. 2d 161, 305
N.E.2d 903, 350 N.Y.S.2d 889 (1973); Renelli v. Department of Mental Hygiene, 73 Misc.
2d 261, 340 N.Y.S.2d 498 (Sup. Ct. 1973). See also Saville v. Treadway, 404 F. Supp. 430
(M.D. Tenn. 1974); Smith v. Wendell, 390 F. Supp. 260 (E.D. Pa. 1975);Lynch v. Baxley,
386 F. Supp. 378 (M.D. Ala. 1974); Weidenfeller v. Kidulis, 380 F. Supp. 445, 451-52
(E.D. Wis. 1974); Stachulak v. Coughlin, 364 F. Supp. 686, 687 (N.D. Ill. 1973); In re
Jones, 338 F. Supp. 428 (D.D.C. 1972);In re D.D., 118 N.J. Super. 1,6,285 A.2d 283,286
(App. Div. 1971).
The court in New York State Ass'n for Retarded Children, Inc. v. Rockefeller, 357 F.
Supp. 752 (E.D.N.Y. 1973), initially rejected the concept of a constitutional right to
treatment in favor of an eighth amendment right for patients to be free from harm. The
court ultimately recognized in a later opinion that "there is no bright line" separating
the right to treatment, the right to care, and the right to be free from harm. New York
State Ass'n for Retarded Children, Inc. v. Carey, 393 F. Supp. 715, 719 (E.D.N.Y. 1975).
See also Scott v. Plank, 532 F.2d 939 (3d Cir. 1976); Eubanks v. Clarke, 434 F. Supp.
1022 (E.D. Pa. 1977); Woe v. Matthews, 408 F. Supp. 419 (E.D.N.Y. 1976), aff'd sub
nom. Woe v. Weinberger, 562 F.2d 40 (2d Cir. 1977).
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such individual treatment as will give him a reasonable opportunity to be cured or to improve his mental ~ondition."'~When
the Supreme Court heard the case, it did not reach the broad
issue of the right to treatment, rather it unanimously ruled on a
single narrower issue in the case. The Court held that "[a] State
cannot constitutionally confine [on the basis of mental illness
alone] a nondangerous individual who is capable of surviving
safely in freedom by himself or with the help of willing and responsible family members or friends.'"O
The United States Supreme Court has never decided
whether a constitutionally-based right to treatment exists. How' Court commented on the
ever, in Kent v. United S t ~ t e s , ~the
plight of children in the juvenile justice system, noting that
"[tlhere is evidence, in fact, that there may be grounds for concern that the child receives the worst of both worlds: that he
gets neither the protections accorded to adults nor the solicitous
care and regenerative treatment postulated for children."82 And
, ~ Court
~
"reiterate[d] the view" of Kent
later, in I n re G a ~ l tthe
that juvenile justice procedures need not meet the constitutional
requirements of adult criminal trials, but must provide essential
"due process and fair treatment."84
In the absence of definitive guidance by the Supreme Court,
the lower courts have adopted a variety of approaches in finding
a constitutional basis for the right to treatment? Following
79. Donaldson v. O9Connor, 493 F.2d 507, 520 (5th Cir. 1974), vacated on other
grounds and remanded, 422 U.S. 563 (1975).
80. O'Connor v. Donaldson, 422 U.S. 563,576 (1975). In a concurring opinion, Chief
Justice Burger argued against the existence of a constitutional right to treatment. Id. a t
578 (Burger, C.J., concurring). The narrow holding of the case, and Burger's concurring
opinion have been the subject of extensive comment and criticism. See, e.g., Baldwin,
OYConnorv. Donaldson: Involuntary Civil Commitment and the Right to Treatment, 7
COLUM.
HUMAN
RIGHTSL. REV.573 (1975); Schoenfeld, Recent Developments in the Law
Concerning the Mentally Ill-"A Corner-Stone of Legal Structure Laid in Mud," 9 U .
TOL. L. REV. 1 (1977); Comment, Donaldson, Dangerousness and the Right to Treatment, 3 HASTINGS
CONST.L.Q. 599 (1976); Note, "Without More": A Constitutional
Right to Treatment?, 22 LOY.L. REV.373 (1976); Note, Donaldson v. O'Connor: Constitutional Right to Treatment for the Involuntarily Civilly Committed, 7 N.C. CENT.L.J.
174 (1975); Note, The Supreme Court Sidesteps the Right to Treatment Question-O'Connor v. Donaldson, 47 U. COLO.L. REV.299 (1976); Note, The Right to TreatL. REV.374 (1975).
ment Case-That Wasn't, 30 U . MIAMIL. REV.486 (1976); 9 AKRON
81. 383 U.S. 541 (1966).
82. Id. at 556.
83. 387 U.S. 1 (1967).
84. Id. at 30. See also Breed v. Jones, 421 U.S. 519 (1975); McKeiver v. Pennsylvania, 403 U.S. 528 (1971); In re Winship, 397 US. 358 (1970).
85. It should be remembered that constitutional challenges to the detention of chil-
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Judge Bazelon's lead in Rouse v. C a r n e r ~ n some
, ~ ~ courts have
based the right to treatment on a procedural due process and
"quid pro quo" rationale: if the state involuntarily commits
mentally ill or otherwise incompetent individuals to its custody
without the procedural safeguards to which they are entitled in
criminal prosecutions, it must correspondingly provide treatment that will rehabilitate the individual from his illness or disability. Thus, while the individual loses constitutional procedural protections, he gains rehabilitative treatment."
Other courts have adopted Judge Bazelon's invocation of
the due process clause? Wyatt v. Stickney was the first case to
hold that the failure to provide adequate treatment is a violation
of the constitutional right to due process: "To deprive any citizen of his or her liberty upon the altruistic theory that the confinement is for humane therapeutic reasons and then fail to provide adequate treatment violates the very fundamentals of due
process."8e This argument is grounded on the rule articulated by
the Supreme Court in Jackson v. IndianaM that "due process
requires that the nature and duration of commitment bear some
reasonable relation to the purpose for which the individual is
committed.""
Several courts have found a constitutional basis for the
right to treatment in the eighth amendment's prohibition
against cruel and unusual punishment." The reasoning of these
dren in jails are not dependent upon a ritual incantation of the phrase "right to treatment," or upon a "right to treatment" analysis of the issues. Such detention may be
challenged directly as violations of constitutional guarantees such as due process and
freedom from cruel and unusual punishment.
86. 373 F.2d 451 (D.C. Cir. 1966). See text accompanying note 71 supra.
87. See text accompanying notes 102-13 infra. One commentator has found three
variations of the "quid pro quo" rationale as used by the courts: "paradigm" quid pro
quo, "procedural" quid pro quo, and "pseudo" quid pro quo. Spece, Preserving the Right
to Treatment: A Critical Assessment and Constructive Development of Constitutional
Right to Treatment Theories, 20 ARIZ.L. REV. 1, 4 (1978).
88. See text accompanying note 72 supra.
89. 325 F. Supp. 781, 785 (M.D. Ala. 1971).
90. 406 U.S. 715 (1972).
91. Id. at 738. In an even broader sense, the argument is based upon the principle
that legislative means must be rationally related to legislative ends. See Developments,
supra note 77, a t 1326. See also Nebbia v. New York, 291 U.S. 502, 525 (1934); Meyer v.
Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390 (1923).
92. See, e.g., Rouse v. Cameron, 373 F.2d 451 (D.C. Cir. 1966); Halderman v. Pennhurst State School and Hosp., 446 F. Supp. 1295, 1315 (E.D. Pa. 1977); United States v.
Johnston, 317 F. Supp. 66, 68 (S.D.N.Y. 1970); People v. Feagley, 14 Cal. 3d 338, 535
P.2d 373, 121 Cal. Rptr. 509 (1975); People v. Wilkins, 23 App. Div. 178, 259 N.Y.S.2d
462 (1965). See also Spece, supra note 87, a t 17.
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courts rests on the principle established by the Supreme Court
in Robinson v. Californiae3 that punishment of certain "statuses," such as drug addiction, constitutes cruel and unusual
punishment. Under this rationale, mental illness or other incompetency is considered a status, and the drastic curtailment of
liberty accompanying confinement without treatment is considered cruel and unusual p u n i ~ h m e n t . ~ ~
Some courts have found that the state has a constitutional
duty to protect involuntarily confined inmates from harm. At
least one court has expanded this principle to include a right to
a t least a minimum level of psychological treatment;e5 other
courts have registered approval of the basic rationale?
Still other courts have based the right to treatment on the
principle that the curtailment of fundamental liberties through
involuntary confinement must follow the "least restrictive alternative" available. This principle was presented by the Supreme
Court in Shelton u. Tucker:@'
[Elven though the governmental purpose be legitimate and
substantial, that purpose cannot be pursued by means that
broadly stifle fundamental personal liberties when the end can
be more narrowly achieved. The breadth of legislative abridgment must be viewed in the light of less drastic means for
achieving the same basic purpose.s8

According to this rationale, the state violates an individual's
constitutional rights when it confines him and fails to provide
minimally adequate treatment and habitation in the least restrictive setting p o s ~ i b l e . ~
Finally, a number of courts have followed Rouse u. Cameron
93. 370 U.S. 660 (1962). See Comment, The Eighth Amendment Right to Treatment for Involuntarily Committed Mental Patients, 61 IOWA L. REV.1057 (1976).
94. See text accompanying notes 118-25 infra.
95. New York Ass'n for Retarded Children, Inc. v. Rockefeller, 357 F. Supp. 752
(E.D.N.Y. 1973), consent decree approved, New York Ass'n for Retarded Children, Inc.
v. Carey, 393 F. Supp. 715 (E.D.N.Y. 1975).
96. See, e.g., Halderman v. Pennhurst State School and Hosp., 446 F. Supp. at 1318;
Woe v. Mathews, 408 F. Supp. 419 (E.D.N.Y. 1976). Cf. Bowring v. Godwin, 551 F.2d 44
(4th Cir. 1977); Laaman v. Helgemoe, 437 F. Supp. 269 (D.N.H. 1977) ("protection from
harm" rationale applied in prison context). See Spece, supra note 87, at 28.
97. 364 US. 479 (1960).
98. Id. at 488 (footnotes omitted).
99. See Halderman v. Pennhurst State School and Hosp., 446 F. Supp. a t 1318; Woe
v. Mathews, 408 F. Supp. 419 (E.D.N.Y. 1976); Wyatt v. Stickney, 325 F. Supp. 781
(M.D. Ala. 1971).
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directlylo0and have found a basis for the right to treatment in
state statutory and constitutional provisions.101
b. Confinement of children in jails. The right to treatment
doctrine, developed in cases involving persons involuntarily confined for mental illness, applies with equal force to the confinement of children in jails.loa The juvenile justice system is premised on the goal of rehabilitation, and juvenile courts have
always been considered analogous to social welfare agencies,
designed to provide treatment and assistance for children who
have violated criminal sanctions or demonstrated socially unacceptable behavior.loS
The courts have recognized this principle. In one of the earliest cases considering the right to treatment, White u. Reid,lW
the petitioner was a juvenile being held in a District of Columbia
jail as a result of an alleged parole violation. Although the decision was based on statutory grounds, the court noted that the
commitment of the child to an adult jail rather than to a
nonpunitive educational facility "cannot withstand an assault
for violation of fundamental Constitutional safeguards."lo6
The constitutional bases adopted by courts in applying the
right to treatment doctrine to juveniles have been as diverse as
those invoked in the cases involving mental illness. The procedural due processlquid pro quo reasoning has been invoked by
several courts. In Morgan u. Sproat,lWthe court concluded that
juveniles who have been involuntarily committed have a constitutional right to treatment that emanates from two concepts.
First, juveniles are incarcerated for the purpose of care and re100. See text accompanying note 69 supra.
101. See notes 131-34 and accompanying text infra.
102. See, e.g., Renn, The Right to Treatment and the Juvenile, 19 CRIME
& DELINQUENCY 477 (1973); Note, The Right to Treatment for Mentally Ill Juveniles in CaliforL.J. 865 (1976); Note, A Right to Treatment for Juveniles?, 1973
nia, 27 HASTINGS
WASH.U.L.Q. 157.
JUVENILE
JUSTICE
PH~OSOPHY
103. See generally F. FAUST& P. BRANTINGTON,
(1974); A. PLAT^, THECHILD
SAVERS:
THEINVENTION
OF DELINQUENCY
(1969); Fox, Juvenile Justice Reform: -4n Historical Perspective, 22 STAN.L. REV.1187 (1970); Mack, The
Juvenile Court, 23 HARV.L. REV.104 (1909); Paulsen, Kent v. United States: The Constitutional Context of Juvenile Cases, 1966 SUP. CT. REV.167; Piersma, Ganousis &
Kramer, The Juvenile Court: Current Problems, Legislative Proposals, and a Model
Act, 20 ST. LOUISU.L.J. 1 (1975).
104. 125 F. Supp. 647 (D.D.C. 1954).
105. Id. at 650.
106. 432 F. Supp. 1130 (S.D. Miss. 1977).
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habilitation. The reasoning of Jackson v. Indianalo7 requires
that the program at the facility be reasonably related to that
purpose. Second, juveniles are incarcerated without being provided all the due process protections afforded adults in criminal
cases. "This denial of due process safeguards would be constitutionally impermissible unless the incarceration of juveniles
serves beneficent, rather than punitive, purposes. . . For these
reasons, the courts have held that due process requires that the
incarceration of juveniles be for rehabilitation and treatment."lo8
In Gary W. u. Louisiana,lo9the court based its decision on
the theory that the state may curtail a person's liberty in a noncriminal context only if there is rehabilitative treatment exchanged for the equivalent denial of liberty. In defining this
trade-off, the court concluded "[tlhat quid pro quo is care or
treatment of the kind required to achieve the purpose of confinement."l1° The court found that there is a constitutional right
to treatment; however, what constitutes proper treatment must
be decided on an individual basis:

.

The constitutional right to treatment is a right to a program of
treatment that affords the individual a reasonable chance to
acquire and maintain those life skills that enable him to cope
as effectively as his own capacities permit with the demands of
his own person and of his environment and to raise the level of
his physical, mental and social efficiency.
. What the constitution requires as the state's due to
the individual it confines is a program that is proper for that
individual.

..

Another federal court adopting the quid pro quo theory112 concluded that juvenile adjudications do not contain all of the due
process safeguards found in adult adjudications because the
goals of the juvenile justice system differ from those of the criminal justice system. The purposes of the criminal justice system
are punishment, deterrence, and retribution while the primary
goal of the juvenile justice system is rehabilitation. "Thus due
process in the juvenile justice system requires that the post-adjudicative stage of institutionalization further this goal of
107.
108.
109.
110.
111.
112.

406 U.S. 715 (1972).
432 F. Supp. at 1136 (citation omitted).
437 F. Supp. 1209 (E.D. La. 1976).
Id. at 1216.
Id. at 1219.
Inmates of Boys' Training School v. Affleck, 346 F. Supp. 1354 (D.R.I. 1972).
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rehabilitation."'l3
The procedural due processlquid pro quo rationale has been
employed to declare that the confinement of children in jails violates the children's constitutional rights. In Baker v. Hamilton,li4 the parents of two boys confined in a county jail for four
days and four weeks respectively, brought a class action against
the sheriff, the jail warden, and four juvenile court judges. The
class action was commenced on behalf of the two boys and fiftyeight other boys who had been confined in the jail during 1971.
After hearing expert testimony concerning the effects on
juveniles of detention in the jail, and after personally visiting
the jail, the judge ruled that the system of selective pre- and
post-dispositional placement of juveniles in the jail constituted
punishment of the juveniles as adults without the due process
protections afforded adults. The court concluded that regardless
of how well-intentioned the juvenile court judges may have been,
their acts constituted violations of the fourteenth amendment.llb
Other courts have found a more general basis for the right
to treatment in the due process clause. In Pena v. New York
State Division for Youth,l16 the court held that the absence of
rehabilitative treatment of youth confined in the juvenile justice
system constitutes a violation of due process rights guaranteed
under the fourteenth amendment.l17
Several courts have found the basis for juveniles' right to
treatment in the eighth amendment prohibition against cruel
and unusual punishment. In Cox v. Turley,l18 the court specifi113. Id. at 1364.
114. 345 F. Supp. 345 (W.D. Ky. 1972).
115. Id. at 352. See also Fulwood v. Stone, 394 F.2d 939 (D.C. Cir. 1967); Creek v.
Stone, 379 F.2d 106 (D.C. Cir. 1967); Nelson v. Heyne, 355 F. Supp. 451 (N.D. Ind. 1972),
aff'd, 491 F.2d 352 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 417 U.S. 976 (1974); Kautter v. Reid, 183 F.
Supp. 352 (D.D.C. 1960). In Kautter, the district court held that since children have not
been protected by the full mantle of constitutional safeguards, "[tlo put such a child in
'a place for [the] punishment of crimes' whose 'customary occupants are persons convicted of crime or awaiting trial for crime' would, therefore, raise a serious constitutional
question." 183 F. Supp. at 354 (quoting Benton v. Reid, 231 F.2d 780, 782 (D.C. Cir.
1956)) (footnote omitted). Other courts have not hesitated to find that governments
must provide something to a person in exchange for a loss of liberty following a procedure in which a person is denied the full panoply of due process safeguards. See Jackson
v. Indiana, 406 U.S. 715 (1975); McNeil v. Director, Patuxent Inst., 407 U.S. 245 (1972);
Humphrey v. Cady, 405 U.S. 504 (1972); Commonwealth v. Page, 339 Mass. 313, 159
N.E.2d 82 (1959).
116. 419 F. Supp. 203 (S.D.N.Y. 1976).
117. Id. at 206-07; accord, Martarella v. Kelley, 349 F. Supp. 575 (S.D.N.Y. 1972).
118. 506 F.2d 1347 (6th Cir. 1974).
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cally addressed the preadjudication detention of juveniles in
county jails. The court held that the jailer's refusal to permit the
boy to telephone his parents -and the boy's confinement with the
general jail population without a probable cause hearing, constituted cruel and unusual punishment. The court emphasized:
"The worst and most illegal feature of all these proceedings
[was] in lodging the child with the general population of the jail,
without his ever seeing some official of the court."119
In Swansey u. Elrod,lPojuveniles between the ages of thirteen and sixteen, who had been confined in the Cook County jail
pending prosecution, brought a civil rights action against the
sheriff alleging that such incarceration constituted cruel and unusual punishment. The court heard expert testimony that the
jail experience would cause a " 'devastating, overwhelming emotional trauma with potential consolidation of [these children] in
the direction of criminal behavior.' "lal The expert witness concluded that "the inital period of incarceration is crucial to the
development of a young juvenile: if improperly treated the child
will almost inevitably be converted into a hardened permanent
criminal who will forever be destructive toward society and himself."lP2 The court observed that thirteen to sixteen year olds
"are not merely smaller versions of the adults incarcerated in
[the] Cook County jail."lPS Because the incarceration was devastating to the juvenile and the physical conditions were reprehensible, the court found the incarcerations violated the eighth
amendment. It concluded that the evolving standards of decency
required more adequate conditions.
In Baker v. Hamilton,lB4the court also concluded that the
detention of juveniles in adult jails constitutes cruel and unusual
punishment. The court's discussion is particularly significant because many of the conditions present in the jail in that case are
also present in the jails in rural areas of Utah and other states.
The specific conditions mentioned include cramped quarters,
poor illumination, poor air circulation, and broken locks; also
cited were the lack of outdoor exercise or recreation and the ab119. Id. at 1353.
120. 386 F. Supp. 1138 (N.D.Ill. 1975).
121. Id. at 1141.
122. Id.
123. Id. at 1143.
124. 345 F. Supp. 345 (W.D.
Ky. 1972). See text accompanying notes 114-15supra.
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sence of any attempt a t rehabilitation.la5
Furthermore, juveniles who are assaulted by other inmates
may sue for violation of their right to be reasonably protected
from violence in the facility. Several courts have held that confinement that subjects those incarcerated to assaults and threats
of violence constitutes cruel and unusual punishment.la6In addition, juveniles who are separated from other inmates in order to
protect them from assaults may suffer sensory deprivation and
psychological damage in violation of their constitutional rights.
In Lollis v. New York State Department of Social Services,la7
the court found that the isolation of a fourteen year-old girl in a
bare room without reading materials or other forms of recreation
constituted cruel and unusual punishment. The court relied on
expert opinion that such isolation was "cruel and inhuman."la8
The "protection from harm" rationale for the right to treatmentlas and the principle of the "least restrictive alternative"lgO
125. 345 F. Supp. a t 353. See also Welsch v. Likins, 373 F. Supp. 487 (D. Minn.
1974); Nelson v. Heyne, 355 F. Supp. 451 (N.D. Ind. 1972), aff'd,491 F.2d 352 (7th Cir.),
cert. denied, 417 U.S. 976 (1974); State v. Wilt, 252 S.E.2d 168 (W. Va. 1979); State v.
Strickler, 251 S.E.2d 222 (W. Va. 1979).
126. See, e.g., Cox v. Turley, 506 F.2d 1347 (6th Cir. 1974); Woodhous v. Virginia,
487 F.2d 889 (4th Cir. 1973); Brown v. United States, 486 F.2d 284 (8th Cir. 1973); Roberts v. Williams, 456 F.2d 819 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 866 (1971); Bethea v.
Crouse, 417 F.2d 504 (10th Cir. 1969); Penn v. Oliver, 351 F. Supp. 1292 (E.D. Va. 1972);
Gates v. Collier, 340 F. Supp. 881 (N.D. Miss. 1972); Holt v. Sarver, 309 F. Supp. 362
(E.D. Ark. 1970), aff'd,442 F.2d 304 (8th Cir. 1971); Kish v. Milwaukee, 48 F.R.D. 102
(E.D. Wis. 1969), aff'd,441 F.2d 901 (7th Cir. 1971).
127. 322 F. Supp. 473 (S.D.N.Y. 1970).
128. Id. a t 480. See 16 ST. LOUISU.L.J. 340 (1971). There has been considerable
discussion whether the eighth amendment ban against cruel and unusual punishment is
limited to punishment imposed as a result of conviction for crime, and thus does not
apply to confinements such as civil commitments or detention of juveniles in jails. See
Clark, Civil and Criminal Penalties and Forfeitures: A Framework for Constitutional
L. REV. 379, 489 (1976); Spece, supra note 87, at 17-28; DevelopAnalysis, 60 MINN.
ments, supra note 77, a t 1259-64. In Ingraham v. Wright, 430 US. 651 (1977), the Supreme Court held that the eighth amendment does not apply to corporal punishment in
public schools and indicated that it applys only to criminal punishments. Id. at 664-68.
However, the Court explicitly did not consider "whether or under what circumstances
persons involuntarily confined in mental or juvenile institutions can claim the protection
of the Eighth Amendment." Id. at 669 n.37. Since detention of children in jails is closely
analogous to criminal punishment, the constitutional protection should apply. In addition, the Court noted that public school children have little need for eighth amendment
protection, in view of the "openness" of the institution, id. at 670, a consideration that
cuts the opposite way in dealing with the detention of children in jails. See generally
Roberts, Right to Treatment for the Civilly Committed: A New Eighth Amendment
Basis, 45 U. CHI. L. REV.731 (1978).
129. See notes 95-96 and accompanying text supra.
130. See notes 97-99 and accompanying text supra. See also Gary W. v. Louisiana,
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have also been applied by several courts in the juvenile context.
Finally, a number of courts have found the right to treatment for juveniles grounded in state statutory or constitutional
law. In Creek v. Stone,lS1a juvenile placed in a detention home
prior to adjudication alleged that the home did not have facilities for the psychiatric care he needed. After analyzing the language of the District of Columbia Juvenile Court Act, the
United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit concluded that the Act "establishe[d] not only an important
policy objective, but, in an appropriate case, a legal right to a
custody that is not inconsistent with the parens patriae premise
of the law."lS2 Similarly, in Nelson v. Heyne,lS3the Seventh Circuit ruled that the Indiana Juvenile Court Act provided a statutory basis for the right to rehabilitative treatment.lS4
c. Enforcing the right to treatment-section 1983. A juvenile's right to treatment may be enforced in a number of ways.
The most commonly used vehicle for protecting civil rights is 42
U.S.C. 5 1983.lS5Along with its jurisdictional counterpart, 28
437 F. Supp. 1209 (E.D. La. 1976); Morales v. Turman, 383 F. Supp. 53, 124 (E.D. Tex.
1974), rev'd and remanded, 535 F.2d 864 (5th Cir. 1976), reu'd and remanded, 430 U.S.
322 (1977), remanded, 562 F.2d 993 (5th Cir. 1977); Welsch v. Likins, 373 F. Supp. 387
(D. Minn. 1974).
131. 379 F.2d 106 (D.C. Cir. 1967).
132. Id. at 111.
133. 491 F.2d 352 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 417 U.S. 976 (1974).
134. Id. at 360 n.12. See McRedmond v. Wilson, 533 F.2d 757 (2d Cir. 1976);
Lavette M. v. Corporation Counsel of N.Y., 35 N.Y.2d 136,316 N.E.2d 314,359 N.Y.S.2d
20 (1974); Ellery C. v. Redlich, 32 N.Y.2d 588, 300 N.E.2d 424, 347 N.Y.S.2d 51 (1973).
See also Martarella v. Kelley, 349 F. Supp. 575 (S.D.N.Y. 1972); Lollis v. New York
State Dep't of Social Sews., 322 F. Supp. 473 (S.D.N.Y. 1970).
A right to rehabilitative treatment is implicit in Utah law. The purpose of the Utah
Juvenile Court Act of 1965 is stated in UTAHCODEANN.5 78-3a-1 (1953):
I t is the purpose of this act to secure for each child coming before the juvenile
court such care, guidance, and control, preferably in his own home, as will
serve his welfare and best interests of the state; to preserve and strengthen
family ties whenever possible; to secure for any child who is removed from his
home the care, guidance, and discipline required to assist him to develop into a
responsible citizen, to improve the conditions and home environment responsible for his delinquency; and, at the same time, to protect the community and
its individual citizens against juvenile violence and juvenile lawbreaking. To
this end this act shall be liberally construed.
The doctrinal and practical difficulties inherent in the "right to treatment" principle
have been debated at length. See, e.g., Gartas, The Constitutional Right to Treatment
for Involuntarily Committed Mental Patients-What Limitations?, 14 WASHBURN
L.J.
291 (1975); Spece, supra note 87; Developments, supra note 77, at 1316.
135. 42 U.S.C. 5 1983 (1976). Section 1983 provides:
Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or
usage, of any State or Territory, subjects or causes to be subjected, any citizen
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U.S.C. 8 1343,lS6section 1983 authorizes lawsuits to be brought
in federal courts for violations of "rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws.'71s7Since the right to
treatment is one of the rights "secured by the Constitution and
laws," it is enforceable under section 1983.
Juveniles confined in jails, however, need not invoke the
conceptual framework of the right to treatment cases in order to
maintain a lawsuit for violation of their civil rights. They may
file lawsuits in federal courts under section 1983 alleging violations of their eighth amendment right of freedom from cruel and
unusual punishment and their fourteenth amendment right of
due process of law. The federal courts have jurisdiction to hear
such claims, just as they have jurisdiction to entertain lawsuits
for alleged violations of the right to treatment.
Under the doctrine of pendent j u r i ~ d i c t i o n ,lawsuits
~ ~ ~ filed
under section 1983 in federal courts may also include claims
under state law when such claims arise out of a common set of
operative facts and form the basis for separate but parallel
grounds for relief. Thus, civil rights violations brought under
section 1983 may be joined with claims under state tort laws.
Juveniles confined in jails may also bring lawsuits in state
courts. Such lawsuits can include claims under section 1983 as
well as claims under state law.ls9 Hence, juveniles may bring
of the United States or other person within the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution
and laws, shall be liable to the party injured in an action at law, suit in equity,
or other proper proceeding for redress.
136. 28 U.S.C. 8 1343 (1976). Section 1343 provides:
The district courts shall have original jurisdiction of any civil action authorized
by law to be commenced by any person:

....

(3) To redress the deprivation, under color of any State law, statute, ordinance, regulation, custom or usage, of any right, privilege or
immunity secured by the Constitution of the United States or by any
Act of Congress providing for equal rights of citizens or of all persons
within the jurisdiction of the United States.
(4) To recover damages or to secure equitable or other relief under
any Act of Congress providing for the protection of civil rights, including the right to vote.
137. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1976).
138. See United Mine Workers v. Gibbs, 383 U.S. 715 (1966).
139. See Maine v. Thiboutot, 100 S. Ct. 2502 (1980); Long v. District of Columbia,
469 F.2d 927, 937 (D.C. Cir. 1972); International Prisoners' Union v. Rizzo, 356 F. Supp.
806, 810 (E.D.Pa. 1973); Luker v. Nelson, 341 F. Supp. 111, 116 (N.D. Ill. 1972); New
Times, Inc. v. Arizona Bd. of Regents, 110 Ariz. 367, 519 P.2d 169 (1974); Williams v.
Horvath, 16 Cal. 3d 834, 548 P.2d 1125, 129 Cal. Rptr. 453 (1976); Brown v. Pitchess, 13
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lawsuits to protect their civil rights in either state or federal
courts. The choice of forum will depend upon the nature of the
claims involved, the applicable state or federal law, the experience of state or federal judges with juvenile civil rights litigation,
and the relative delays in state or federal courts in bringing
cases to trial.
3. 42 U.S.C. § 1988

Section 1988140 is intended to provide an adequate federal
remedy, where existing federal law is inadequate, by incorporating the law of the state in which the federal court sits into federal law."' It does not confer any substantive rights on individuals; rather, it is a hollow vessel that is "filled" by state
substantive law. The sole function of section 1988 is to provide
access to federal courts for persons whose civil rights are recognized by state law but not federal law. In Brazier u. Cherry,""
the court described the function of section 1988 as follows:
Thus 8 1988 declares a simple, direct, abbreviated test: what is
needed in the particular case under scrutiny to make the civil
rights statutes fully effective? The answer to that inquiry is
then matched against (a) federal law and if it is found wanting
the court must look to (b) state law currently in effect. To
whatever extent (b) helps, it is automatically available, not because it is procedure rather than substance, but because Congress says s ~ . ' ~ ~

A substantial number of courts have utilized section 1988,
often in conjunction with section 1983, to fashion remedies for
civil rights inadequately protected by federal law but adequately
protected by state law.144Thus, even if the Juvenile Justice and
--

p

p

Cal. 3d 518, 531 P.2d 772,119 Cal. Rptr. 204 (1975); Gabaldon v. United Farm Workers
Organizing Comm., 35 Cal. App. 3d 757, 762 n.4, 111 Cal. Rptr. 203, 206 n.4 (1973);
Dudley v. Bell, 50 Mich. App. 678, 213 N.W.2d 805 (1973); Clark v. Bond Stores, Inc., 41
App. Div. 2d 620, 340 N.Y.S.2d 847 (1973).
140. 42 U.S.C. 5 1988 (1976).
141. Moor v. County of Alameda, 411 US. 693 (1973).
142. 293 F.2d 401 (5th Cir. 1961).
143. Id. at 409.
144. See, e.g., Hall v. Wooten, 506 F.2d 564 (6th Cir. 1974) (state law applied to
allow maintenance of lawsuit against county jail officials for death of county prisoner
who was brutally murdered by drunken fellow inmates); Johnson v. Greer, 477 F.2d 101
(5th Cir. 1973) (state law applied to hold administrator of psychiatric diagnostic clinic
liable for false imprisonment of plaintiff); Scott v. Vandiver, 476 F.2d 238 (4th Cir. 1973)
(state law applied to hold sheriff liable for assaults committed by temporary law enforcement officers acting under his supervision); Jenkins v. Averett, 424 F.2d 1228 (4th Cir.
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Delinquency Prevention Act does not create a private right of
action against local and state officials, a child detained in an
adult jail in Utah could still sue local and state officials in
federal court under section 1988 by adopting and incorporating Utah tort law and the substantive provisions of sections
55-lla-1 and 78-3a-30 of the Utah Code,146 which prohibit
confinement of juveniles in adult jails.

C. Liability Under State Tort Law
As indicated earlier, local and state officials may incur liability under state tort law for injuries received by juveniles confined in adult jails, whether the injuries arise from the conditions of confinement in the jail or from assaults by other
inmates. The general standard for tort liability was set forth by
In that case
the Utah Supreme Court in Benally v. R0bins0n.l~~
the widow and daughter of the deceased, a prisoner fatally injured in a fall down the stairs at the city jail, sued the arresting
officer and the two officers on duty at the jail for wrongful death.
The general standard of care to which the officers were held
under state law was "that of using the degree of care and caution which an ordinary reasonable and prudent person would use
under the circ~mstances."~~~
In Benally the court cited Thomas v. W i l l i a m ~ lfor
~ ~"an
excellent and accurate statement of an officer's duty to a prisoner in his custody."14@Thomas v. Williams was a wrongful
death action brought against the chief of police by the wife of a
man arrested for drunk driving. The arresting officer had placed
the partially unconscious offender in a cell, but had left him in
possession of matches and cigarettes. The mattress in the cell
was later set ablaze, and the prisoner died of burns and smoke
inhalation. The court articulated the applicable standard of care
as follows:
"A sheriff owes to a prisoner placed in his custody a duty to
keep the prisoner safely and free from harm, to render him
medical aid when necessary, and to treat him humanely and
1970) (federal court may resort to the state law of torts to supply the elements of § 1983
claim).
145. UTAHCODEANN. $8 55-lla-1, 78-3a-30 (1953 & Supp. 1979).
146. 14 Utah 2d 6, 376 P.2d 388 (1962).
147. Id. at 9, 376 P.2d at 390.
148. 105 Ga. App. 321, 124 S.E.2d 409 (1962).
149. 14 Utah 2d at 9 n.2, 376 P.2d at 390 n.2.
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refrain from oppressing him; and where a sheriff is negligent in
his care and custody of a prisoner and as a result the prisoner
receives injury or meets his death, . . the sheriff would, in a
proper case, be liable . to the injured prisoner or to his dependents as the case might be."lS0

. .

.

The court added:
In the performance of his duty to exercise ordinary diligence to keep his prisoner safe and free from harm, an officer
having custody of a prisoner, when he has knowledge of facts
from which it might be concluded that the prisoner may harm
himself or others unless preclusive measures are taken, must
use reasonable care to prevent such harm. In some circumstances reasonable care may require the officer to act affirmatively to fulfil1 his duty.161

In Shefield v. Turner,'" the Utah Supreme Court discussed
whether an individual could be held liable under the state's sovereign immunity act and held that persons in charge of prisons
or jails "could not be held liable unless they were guilty of some
conduct which transcended the bounds of good faith performance of their duty by a wilful or malicious wrongful act which
they know or should know would result in injury."lm A sheriff
who confines a child in an adult jail could be held liable for injuries sustained by the child as a consequence of that confinement.
This result obtains for two reasons. First, confinement of a child
in an adult jail "transcend[s] the bounds of good faith performance of [the sheriff's] duty," since it is directly contrary to state
law. A sheriff cannot act within his duty in confining a child in
an adult jail when state law specifically prohibits such confinement. Second, it is so widely acknowledged that confinement of
juveniles in adult jails is seriously harmful to juveniles that the
sheriff "knows or should know" that such confinement would result in injury to the child.
In order to establish liability under a common law tort theory, an injured juvenile would be required to prove that the
sheriff was negligent for confining him in the jail, and that such
negligence was the proximate cause of the juvenile's injuries.
Since it would be reasonably foreseeable that a child confined in
150. 105 Ga. App. at 326, 124 S.E.2d at 412-13 (quoting Kendrick v. Adamson, 51
Ga. App. 402, 180 S.E. 647 (1935)).
151. Id. at 327, 124 S.E.2d at 413.
152. 21 Utah 2d 314,445 P.2d 367 (1968).
153. Id. at 317, 445 P.2d at 369.
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an adult jail would suffer emotional, psychological, or physical
injuries, the sheriffs negligent act in confining the child in the
adult jail would be a proximate cause of the injuries. Moreover,
the sheriffs violation of the clear statutory mandate would constitute negligence per se.lM A sheriff who confines a juvenile in
an adult jail is therefore extremely vulnerable in a lawsuit for
damages on behalf of a confined juvenile.
I t is more difficult to determine whether other officials, such
as county commissioners, could be held liable in a tort action for
injuries sustained by a juvenile incarcerated in an adult jail.
Since county commissioners are specifically charged by state law
with the responsibility of providing adequate detention facilities,'" their failure to provide such facilities would constitute a
dereliction of their duties under state law and would therefore
constitute negligence.
The establishment of the proximate cause element in an action brought against county commissioners would appear to be
more difficult because they do not have direct authority over
specific juveniles detained in the jails. Aside from the possibility
that failure to provide adequate detention facilities could be
considered negligence per se, the critical issue is whether injuries
to children are a foreseeable consequence of that failure to fulfill
the statutory mandate. Under Utah law the county commissioners could be considered "early wrongdoers" for having initially
failed to provide adequate detention facilities, while the sheriff
could be considered a "later wrongdoer" for confining juveniles
in the adult jail when adequate detention facilities were not
available. Since both the county commissioners and the sheriff
154. Prosser has said the following concerning per se violations of satutory mandate:
Once the statute is determined to be applicable-which is to say, once it is
interpreted as designed to protect the class of persons in which the plaintiff is
included, against the risk of the type of harm which has in fact occurred as a
result of its violation-the great majority of the courts hold that an unexcused
violation is conclusive on the issue of negligence, and that the court must so
direct the jury. The standard of conduct is taken over by the court from that
fixed by the legislature, and "jurors have no dispensing power by which to relax it," except in so far as the court may recognize the possibility of a valid
excuse for disobedience of the law. This usually is expressed by saying that the
unexcused violation is negligence "per se," or in itself.
PROSSER,
HANDBOOK
OF THE LAWOF TORTS200 (4th ed. 197l)(footnotes omitted). For a
discussion of the principle of negligence per se under New Mexico law, see Castillo v.
United States, 406 F. Supp. 585, 591 (D.N.M. 1975), aff'd, 552 F.2d 1385 (10th Cir.
1977).
155. UTAHCODEANN.$9 55-lla-1 to 2 (Supp. 1979).
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would have violated state law, and therefore would be negligent,
it appears that both the sheriff and the commissioners could be
held liable if the injuries to juveniles are foreseeable. In the
leading Utah case on proximate cause, Hillyard v. Utah ByProducts Co.,'" the Utah Supreme Court noted:

-. -

"The earlier of the two wrongdoers, even though his wrong
has merely set the stage on which the later wrongdoer acts to
the plaintiff's injury, is in most jurisdictions no longer relieved
from responsibility merely because the later act of the other
wrongdoer has been a means by which his own misconduct was
made harmful. The test has come to be whether the later act,
which realized the harmful potentialities of the situation created by the defendant, was itself f~reseeable."'~~

Holding the county commissioners liable for the sheriffs act
of placing juveniles in adult jails would be "based upon the proposition that one cannot excuse himself from liability arising
from his negligent acts merely because the later negligence of
another concurs to cause an injury if the later act was a legally
foreseeable event."168 Thus, the fact that the sheriff directly
places a juvenile in an adult jail does not insulate the county
commissioners from liability. Since their failure to provide adequate detention facilities is contrary to state law, and since injury to juveniles is foreseeable, they may be held liable in damage actions.
As indicated earlier, under the doctrine of pendent jurisdiction, state tort claims could be joined with federal civil rights
claims in lawsuits filed in federal court. Hence, sheriffs or county
commissioners could be sued in federal court for violations of
federal law, the Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention
Act, and the federal Civil Rights Act. They could also be sued in
the same action for negligence under state law.'"
IV. IMMUNITY
OF STATE
AND LOCAL
OFFICIALS
The current doctrines of sovereign immunity arose from
power struggles in feudal England. The ancient English tradition
156. 1 Utah 2d 143, 263 P.2d 287 (1953).
157. Id. at 148-49, 263 P.2d at 290-91 (quoting Bohlen, Fifty Years of Torts, 50
HARV.L. REV.1225, 1229 (1937)).
158. Id. at 149, 263 P.2d at 291 (footnote omitted) (emphasis in original).
159. See text accompanying notes 135-39 supra. Juveniles could also sue for false
imprisonment. See Douthit v. Jones, 619 F.2d 527 (5th Cir. 1980).
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that "the King could do no wrong," meant that he could not be
sued on any grounds. Since the judges at the time were agents of
the King, they too enjoyed absolute immunity. The English Parliament in 1688 conferred immunity upon itself in the Bill of
Rights in order to protect its independence from the King.160.
The doctrine that the government cannot be sued took early
root in the United States and is still stringently adhered to in
some states.
It is important 'to remember that any applicable immunity
usually only protects a public official from liability for damages;
with few exceptions, public officials are not immune to lawsuits
for declaratory and injunctive relief.

A. Immunity Under Federal Law for Violation of Civil
Rights
1. Immunity of judges, prosecutors, and legislators

As a practical matter, judges, prosecutors, and legislators
enjoy virtually absolute immunity for acts done in the performance of their official duties. Recent Supreme Court cases demonstrate the extensive breadth of this immunity. In Stump v.
Sparkman,161 a woman brought suit again* an Indiana circuit
court judge who had approved a petition by her mother to have
the woman sterilized when she was only fifteen. The young girl
went to the hospital ostensibly to have her appendix removed; in
fact, a tubal ligation was performed. No hearing was held on the
petition, and no one was appointed to represent the interests of
the girl, who was never informed of the nature of the operation
to be performed on her. She learned of the sterilization only after she married and attempted to have children. Nevertheless,
the Supreme Court ruled that a judge enjoys absolute immunity
unless the act done is "in clear absence of all jurisdiction" or is
nonjudicial in nature. Since Indiana law gave circuit judges jurisdiction to act upon petitions for sterilization, the Supreme
160. See generally Freed, Executive Oficial Immunity for Constitutional Violations: An Analysis and a Critique, 72 Nw. U.L. REV.526 (1977). Clearly, the doctrine of
sovereign immunity has been substantially eroded in this country. This deterioration has
been caused both by statutory changes and court rulings. The first state to abrogate the
doctrine statutorily was New York in 1929. N.Y.CT. CL. ACT8 8 (McKinney 1963). The
federal government followed suit in 1946. Federal Tort Claims Act, 28 U.S.C. $8 1346(b),
2671-2680 (1970).
161. 435 U S . 349 (1978).
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Court ruled that the judge could not be held liable.lB2
Similar principles apply to legislators and prosecutors. In
,~~~
had circulated a petition in
Tenney u. B r a n d h o ~ eBrandhove
the California legislature opposing the Tenney Committee on
Un-American Activities. The Committee called Brandhove as a
witness and prosecuted him when he refused to testify. In
Brandhove's lawsuit against members of the Committee for violating his constitutional rights, the Supreme Court ruled that
legislators could not be held liable for their official acts, even
when they used the legislative process to punish the exercise of
first amendment rights. In Imbler v. Pachtman,la the Court upheld the immunity of a prosecutor who knowingly used perjured
evidence.
However, when judges, legislators, and prosecutors act
outside of their official realm, they do not enjoy absolute immunity from liability. Courts have held judges liable where they
issued orders not authorized by state law,lB6interfered with
judicial proceedings after being disqualified,lq assaulted a person in their courtroom,167or performed legislative or administrative (as opposed to judicial) functions.lB8In these situations, a
qualified, "good faith" immunity applies, rather than absolute
immunity.16@
Concerning the acts of legislators, the courts have held that
the following activities are not legislative in nature: distributing
to the public materials gathered by a legislative committee,170
accepting bribes in return for votes,171 and enforcing or executing illegal legislative bills.17' Any immunity that applies to legislators also encompasses their aides and employees performing
legislative action that would be protected if performed directly
162. See Note, Judicial Immunity: An Unqualified Sanction of Tyranny From the
Bench?, 30 U. FLA.L. REV.810 (1978).
163. 341 US. 367 (1951).
164. 424 U.S. 409 (1976).
165. Wade v. Bethesda Hosp., 337 F. Supp. 671 (S.D. Ohio 1971).
166. Spires v. Bottorff, 317 F.2d 273 (7th Cir. 1963).
167. Gregory v. Thompson, 500 F.2d 59 (9th Cir. 1974); Lucarell v. McNair, 453
F.2d 836 (6th Cir. 1972).
168. Lynch v. Johnson, 420 F.2d 818 (6th Cir. 1970); Bauers v. Heisel, 361 F.2d 581
(3rd Cir. 1966); Robichaud v. Ronan, 351 F.2d 533 (9th Cir. 1965); Atcherson v.
Siebenmann, 458 F. Supp. 526 (S.D. Iowa 1978), modified, 605 F.2d 1058 (8th Cir. 1979).
169. Lynch v. Johnson, 420 F.2d 818 (6th Cir. 1970).
170. Doe v. McMillan, 412 U.S. 306 (1973).
171. See United States v. Brewster, 408 U.S. 501 (1972).
172. Gravel v. United States, 408 U.S. 606 (1972).
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by the legislator.17' On the other hand, quasi-legislative officials
like county commissioners or city council members are generally
accorded only a qualified, "good faith" immunity similar to that
enjoyed by executive officials.17'
2. Immunity of executive officials

The courts have applied different types of immunity to executive officials, depending upon the nature of the wrong alleged. In Barr v. matte^,'^^ employees of the Federal Office of
Rent Stabilization sued their superior for libelous statements
contained in a press release he had issued. The Supreme Court
held that a low-level federal administrative official who has been
sued for defamation is absolutely immune from liability. Since
Barr, the lower federal courts have extended the decision, conferring absolute immunity on federal executive officials for virtually all tort actions based on "discretionary" acts.176
When government officials are accused of violating the constitutional rights of others, however, they enjoy only a qualified
or limited immunity. In Scheuer v. Rhodes,lT7the Governor of
Ohio and other high state officials were accused of unnecessarily
deploying National Guard troops at Kent State University, and
thereby "intentionally, recklessly, willfully, and wantonly" violating the rights of four students who were killed in the resulting
confrontation. The Supreme Court noted that there is leeway in
the law for public officials to make mistakes:
Public officials, whether governors, mayors or police, legislatots
or judges, who fail to make decisions when they are needed or
who do not act to implement decisions when they are made do
not fully and faithfully perform the duties of their offices. Implicit in the idea that officials have some immunity-absolute
or qualified-for their acts, is a recognition that they may err.
The concept of immunity assumes this and goes on to assume
that it is better to risk some error and possible injury from
173. Id.
174. See Charlotte v. Local 660, Intl Ass'n of Firefighters, 426 U.S. 283 (1976);
Lynch v. Johnson, 420 F.2d 818 (6th Cir. 1970); Adler v. Lynch, 415 F. Supp. 705 (D.
Neb. 1976); Oberhelman v. Schultze, 371 F. Supp. 1089 (D. Minn. 1974), aff'd without
opinion,505 F.2d 736 (8th Cir. 1974). See also Cobb v. City of Malden, 202 F.2d 701,705
(1st Cir. 1953) (Magruder, C.J., concurring).
175. 360 U.S. 564 (1959).
176. See, e.g., Sowders v. Damron, 457 F.2d 1182 (10th Cir. 1972); Estate of Burks v.
Ross, 438 F.2d 230 (6th Cir. 1971).
177. 416 U.S. 232 (1974).
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such error than not to decide or act at all.178

Moreover, the Court stated that high officials are granted more
leeway than their subordinates: the higher the official position,
the broader the range of duties and responsibilities of the official, and the greater the scope of allowable discretion.
The qualified immunity of an executive official, therefore,
depends upon the particular position the official holds and the
circumstances surrounding the official acts. The Supreme Court
described the immunity as follows:
These considerations suggest that, in varying scope, a qualified
immunity is available to officers of the executive branch of government, the variation being dependent upon the scope of discretion and responsibilities of the office and all the circumstances as they reasonably appeared a t the time of the action
on which liability is sought to be based. It is the existence of
reasonable grounds for the belief formed at the time and in the
light of all the circumstances, coupled with good-faith belief,
that affords a basis for qualified immunity of executive officers
for acts performed in the course of official conduct.17B

In Wood v. S t r i ~ k l a n da, ~civil
~ ~rights case brought by public high school students who claimed that they were expelled
from school in violation of their constitutional rights, the Supreme Court clarified its description of limited executive immunity. Although the specific holding of the case relates to school
board members, the standard for immunity should apply to
other executive officials as well:
[W]e hold that a school board member is not immune from
liability for damages under 1 1983 if he knew or reasonably
should have known that the action he took within his sphere of
official responsibility would violate the constitutional rights of
the student affected, or if he took the action with the malicious
intention to cause a deprivation of constitutional rights or
other injury to the student. That is not to say that school
board members are "charged with predicting the future course
A compensatory award will be apof constitutional law." .
propriate only if the school board member has acted with such
an impermissible motivation or with such disregard of the student's clearly established constitutional rights that his action

..

178. Id. at 241-42 (footnote omitted).
179. Id. at 247-48.
180. 420 U.S. 308 (1975).
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cannot reasonably be characterized as being in good faith.18'

Thus, there are two critical questions after Wood u. Strickland: whether the official acted with malice, and whether the official's actions were reasonable in light of the information available and the existing state of the law. If the official acted with
malice toward the plaintiff, or if the official's actions were unreasonable in light of the available information and the state of the
law, there is no immunity.
Good faith conduct must be proven by the official asserting
the immunity.182The lack of malice does not in and of itself establish good faith. Neither does a refusal to do what one knows
or should know is legal because of a fear of the repercussions
justify the conduct.18aIn addition, failure on the part of an official to take appropriate steps to avoid the injury complained of
may defeat a "good faith" defense to a damage action even if the
official did not act out of malice or ill will.184 Finally, lack of
good faith may be inferred from failure to act.186
In view of the explicit prohibitions in state and federal statutes against the confinement of juveniles in adult jails, it is
doubtful that local executive officials could assert a "good faith"
defense for such illegal i n c a r ~ e r a t i o n . ~ ~ ~
181. Id. at 322 (citation omitted) (quoting Pierson v. Ray, 386 U.S. 547,557 (1967)).
See also Procunier v. Navarette, 434 U.S. 555 (1978).
182. Skehan v. Board of Trustees of Bloomsburg State College, 538 F.2d 53 (3d Cir.
1976); Zweibon v. Mitchell, 516 F.2d 594, 671 (D.C.Cir. 1975). According to the recent
case of Gomez v. Toledo, 100 S. Ct. 1920 (1980), the plaintiff need not allege bad faith in
his complaint.
183. See, e.g., Schiff v. Williams, 519 F.2d 257 (5th Cir. 1975); Faraca v. Clements,
506 F.2d 956 (5th Cir. 1975).
184. See, e.g., Bryan v. Jones, 530 F.2d 1210, 1215 (5th Cir. 1976).
185. See, e.g., Sims v. Adams, 537 F.2d 829 (5th Cir. 1976); Harris v. Chanclor, 537
F.2d 203 (5th Cir. 1976); Downie v. Powers, 193 F.2d 760 (10th Cir. 1951).
186. Regarding the scope of immunity of executive officials under Scheuer v. Rhodes
and Wood v. Strickland, see Anson, Implications of Goss v. Lopez and Wood v. Strickland for Educators; Proceedings of The National Institute of Education Conference, 4
J.L. EDUC.
565 (1975); Kattan, Knocking on Wood: Some Thoughts on the Immunities
of State Officials to Civil Rights Damage Actions, 30 VAND.L. REV.941 (1977); Marquardt & Plenk, School Suspension and the Right of Due Process: The Effects of Goss
and Wood in Utah Schools, 3 J. CONTEMP.
L. 85 (1976); Note, Wood v. Strickland: Liability of School Board Members for Damages Resulting from a Deprivation of a Student's Civil Rights, 13 Cma. W.L. REV.153 (1976); Note, Immunity of Public Officials
from Liability for Damages Under 52 U.S.C. § 1983, 89 HARV.L. REV.219 (1975); Note,
Wood v. Strickland: Issues and Implications for School Board Participation, 15 J. F m .
L. 235 (1976); Note, Sovereign Immunity--Scheuer v. Rhodes: Reconciling Section 1983
Damage Actions With Governmental Immunities, 53 N.C.L. REV.439 (1974); Comment,
OfficialImmunity from Damages in Section 1983 Suits: Wood v. Strickland, 56 OR. L.

'
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3. Immunity of local governmental entities

The Supreme Court initially held, in Monroe v. Pape,ls7
that municipal bodies were not "persons" who could be held liable under section 1983 of the Civil Rights Act. However, in Monell v. Department of Social Services of the City of New
York,lB8the Court overruled Monroe v. Pape and held that local
government units do not enjoy an absolute immunity from liability. Thus, local governmental entities, including cities, towns,
police departments, and city agencies can be sued directly under
section 1983 for money damages and declaratory or injunctive
relief. Such an action may be brought where the allegedly unconstitutional action implements or executes a policy statement,
ordinance, regulation, or decision officially adopted and promulgated by that entity's officers, or where the action constitutes
governmental "custom," even though such a custom has not received formal approval through the entity's official decisionmaking channels.
The Court imposed one limitation on the doctrine it announced in Monell: a municipality cannot be held liable under a
theory of respondeat superior solely because it employs a person
who causes harm to another. Thus, the basis for liability must be
grounded upon an official act, declaration, or custom; the municipality cannot be held liable merely because one of its employees
does something that injures another.18@
4. Liability of public officialsand the eleventh amendment

In 1798 Congress passed the eleventh amendment, which
prohibits suits against the states by citizens or by foreign countries. In Edelman v. Jordan,lw the Supreme Court held that
where a lawsuit names a state official as a defendant and seeks
money damages or restitution that will be paid out of the state
treasury, a request for such relief is in effect a suit against the
REV.124 (1977); Comment, Students' Rights Versus Administrators' Immunity: Goss v.
Lopez and Wood v. Strickland, 50 ST. JOHN'S L. REV. 102 (1975); Note, Civil
Rights-State Executive OfficialsAfforded Qualified Immunity From Liability in Suits
Maintained Under Section 1983, 20 VILL.L. REV. 1057 (1974-75).
187. 365 U.S. 167 (1961).
188. 436 U.S. 658 (1978).
189. Id.; Baskin v. Parker, 602 F.2d 1205 (5th Cir. 1979). The Supreme Court has
recently held that municipalities cannot assert the good-faith defense available to executive officials. See Owen v. City of Independence, 100 S. Ct. 1398 (1980).
190. 415 U.S. 651 (1974).
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state itself, and is therefore barred by the eleventh amendment.
The effect of the eleventh amendment on litigation against
public officials involves the consideration of several important
concepts. First, injunctive relief, as opposed to money damages,
is not barred by the eleventh amendment, even though it may
require significant expenditure of state funds.lel Second, the
eleventh amendment only bars money awards that would be
paid out of the state treasury. Restitution or damage awards
that would originate from a different source are not barred?"
Moreover, state officials are usually sued both in their official
and individual capacities. A judgment against an official in his
individual capacity must be paid by the individual, not the
state, and is therefore not barred by the eleventh amendment.le'
Finally, counties, cities, towns, and other municipal subdivisions
of the state are not protected by the eleventh amendment.lH
5. State governmental immunity acts

State governmental immunity acts may bar litigation
against state and local officials in state court for torts, but they
do not immunize them from federal civil rights claims. In Martinez u. California,le6the survivors of a fifteen year-old girl murdered by a parolee sued state officials for damages in state court.
The Supreme Court held first that the California immunity statute was not unconstitutional when employed to deny a tort
claim arising under state law. However, turning to the appellants' civil rights claim, the Court ruled that the state immunity
statute did not control the section 1983 claim, even though that
claim was being advanced in a state court proceeding.lm
In Hampton u. City of Chicago,le7the Seventh Circuit held
that "[c]onduct by persons acting under color of state law which
is wrongful under 42 U.S.C. 5 1983 or § 1985(3) cannot be immu191. Id.; Ex parte Young, 209 U.S. 123 (1908); McAuliffe v. Carlson, 520 F.2d 1305
(2d Cir. 1975); King v. Carey, 405 F. Supp. 41 (W.D.N.Y. 1975).
192. Bowen v. Hackett, 387 F. Supp. 1212 (D.R.I. 1975); Shiff v. Williams, 519 F.2d
257 (5th Cir. 1975).
193. Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416 U.S. 232 (1974); Clegg v. Slater, 420 F. Supp. 910 (W.D.
Okla. 1976).
194. See Wright v. Houston Independent School Dist., 393 F. Supp. 1149 (S.D. Tex.
1975), vacated on other grounds, 569 F.2d 1383 (2d Cir. 1978).
195. 48 U.S.L.W. 4076 (Sup. Ct. 1980).
196. Id. at 4077.
197. 484 F.2d 602 (7th Cir. 1973).
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nized by state law."le8 Plaintiffs alleged that fourteen Chicago
police officers and fifteen other public officials had engaged in a
conspiracy to deny their first amendment rights as members of
the Black Panther Party by illegal forced entry, unjustifiable use
of excessive and deadly force, and malicious prosecution. The
trial court had relied on the Illinois Tort Immunity Act to dismiss the claims against the fifteen public officials, among whom
were state attorneys who had assisted in the planning and execution of the police raid. The court of appeals held that such
reliance was misplaced since "[a] construction of the federal
statute which permitted a state immunity defense to have controlling effect would transmute a basic guarantee into an illusory
promise; and the supremacy clause of the Constitution insures
that the proper construction may be enforced."w
In Smith v. Losee,'O0 the defendant public officials appealed
from a damages award in a section 1983 civil rights action
brought because of their alleged denial of plaintiffs rights to
free speech and due process. While it held the defendant board
of education immune from state liability for damages because of
the doctrine of governmental immunity, the court of appeals affirmed the trial court's award of actual and punitive damages
against three individual defendants. In applying the doctrine of
official privilege, the court observed:
[Tlhe rule [of official privilege] must be here recognized and
applied. It is one which has been formulated and used in the
federal courts; it must be a "federal" one because the federally
created cause of action [§ 19831 cannot be restricted by state
laws or rules relating to sovereign immunity nor to official
privilege.001

Thus, state governmental immunity acts are not applicable to
section 1983 suits for illegal detention brought by juveniles in
either state or federal courts. The same reasoning applies to actions filed pursuant to section 1988 and the Juvenile Justice and
Delinquency Prevention Act.
198. Id. at 607.
199. Id. Some state statutes explicitly comply with the federal court *kings. See
WASH.REV.CODEANN.3 4.92.170 (Supp. 1978).
200. 485 F.2d 334 (10th Cir. 1973).
201. Id. at 341.
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B. Immunity Under State Law
Modern state laws governing the immunity of governmental
officials, agencies, and units of government from suit for injury
by private persons vary substantially. The Utah statute represents one response. It provides that all governmental entities are
immune from suit for any injury resulting from the activities of
the entity where the entity is engaged in the exercise and discharge of a governmental function, except as otherwise provided
in the Governmental Immunity Act.%02It further provides that
immunity is waived where the injuries are caused by the negligent acts or omissions of employees committed within the scope
of their employment, unless the injuries arise because of assault,
battery, violation of civil rights, or incarceration of any person in
any state prison, county or city jail, or other place of legal confinement..OS Accordingly, the immunity of governmental entities
is not waived as to injuries resulting from the illegal confinement
of juveniles in adult jails.
Colorado law represents a different response. Under the
Colorado Governmental Immunity Act,'04 public entities are
generally immune from damage claims. However, there are six
enumerated exceptions, one of which precludes the use of immunity as a defense in the operation of public hospitals, penitentiaus,
ries, reformatories or j a i l ~ . ~ ~ T h governmental
immunity is
waived as to injuries arising from the incarceration of juveniles
in adult jails in Colorado.
Furthermore, the sovereign immunity defense is not available to public employees and governmental officials in Colorado.
In Kristensen u. Jones," the Colorado Supreme Court ruled
that the immunity act only applies to public entities and not to
employees, who may be sued individually under common law
claims. The immunity act does provide, however, that the governmental entity may be liable for the costs of the defense of an
employee sued for injuries sustained, provided the alleged act or
omission occurred within the scope of employment and was
neither willful nor wanton.207
The New Mexico Tort Claims Act falls somewhere in be202.
203.
204.
205.
206.
207.

UTAHCODEANN. § 63-30-3 (1953).
Id. 63-30-10.
COLO.REV.STAT.$ 24-10-101 to 117 (1973).
Id. $ 24-10-106.
195 Colo. 122, 575 P.2d 854 (1978).
COLO.REV.STAT. 24-10-110 (1973).
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tween the Utah and Colorado acts. It provides that all governmental entities and public employees are immune from suit for
any injury resulting from the activities of the entities or their
employees while acting within the scope of their duties, except
as otherwise provided in the Tort Claims Act.208However, immunity is waived when a claim is made against a public employee for any torts alleged to have been committed within the
scope of his duty and involving any violation of property rights
or any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws of the United States or the constitution and laws
of New Mexico. If a tort committed by a public employee within
the scope of his employment is malicious or fraudulent, the governmental entity is immune from suit but the employee is not."OD
Thus it would appear that sheriffs in New Mexico, as law
enforcement officials, may be liable for injuries arising from incarceration of juveniles in adult jails. Similarly, both sheriffs and
county commissioners may be liable based upon the failure to
adequately maintain and operate the jails. Even assuming for
the sake of argument that sheriffs and county commissioners in
New Mexico are immune for the above reasons, if they act
outside the scope of their official duties, they may be held liable
for injuries resulting from such activities."O
Since the incarceration of children in need of supervision
and of neglected children in adult jails is prohibited by state
statute, and since alleged juvenile delinquents may only be detained under precise and limited circumstances, it would appear
that such incarceration does not fall within the scope of the official duties of any government official.211Accordingly, New Mexico government officials can be held liable for injuries resulting
from illegal confinement of juveniles in adult jails."12
208. N.M. STAT.ANN. 5 41-4-4 (1978).
209. Id. 8 41-4-4B.
210. See Montoya v. City of Albuquerque, 82 N.M. 90, 476 P.2d 60 (1970) (decided
under prior law); Salazar v. Town of Bernalillo, 62 N.M.199, 307 P.2d 186 (1956) (decided under prior law).
211. N.M. STAT.ANN.§ 32-1-25(c), (e) (1978).
212. The Oregon tort claims law, Or. Rev. Stat. $8 30.260-300 (1953), makes every
public body liable for its torts and those of its officials acting within the scope of their
employment except in areas expressly limited by the act. Id. 5 30.265(1). The Oregon law
also contains a "discretionary acts exception" that restores immunity for every public
body and its officers, employees, and agents acting within the scope of their employment
for acts deemed discretionary. The obvious difficulty is in distinguishing discretionary
acts from ministerial or operational ones. See Daugherty v. Oregon State Highway
Comm., 270 Or. 144, 147,526 P.2d 1005, 1006 (1974); Smith v. Cooper, 256 Or. 485, 499,
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C. Indemnification of Local and State Oficials
Utah law provides that public employees who are the subject of lawsuits for activities within the scope of their employment may be defended by the public entity for which they work,
and may be indemnified for money judgments against them resulting from such litigation.213
Local and state officials who are sued for confinement of
juveniles in adult jails may not enjoy the benefits of the Utah
Indemnification Act, however. These officials may be held personally liable for two reasons. First, since such activity is expressly prohibited by state law in Utah, such confinement is not
within the legitimate scope of the officials' public employment.
The rationale is the same in other states where alleged juvenile
delinquents may be held in adult jails under circumstances
where there is no sight and sound separation from adultsF4 Second, section 63-48-3 of the Utah Code expressly states that "[nlo
public entity is obligated to pay any judgment based upon a
claim against an officer or employee if it is established that the
officer or employee acted or failed to act due to gross negligence,
fraud, or malice."216Although "gross negligence" is not suscepti475 P.2d 78, 85 (1970). See also Eldredge v. Kamp Kachess Youth Servs., Inc., 90 Wash.
2d 402, 583 P.2d 626 (1978); Evangelical United Brethren Church v. State, 67 Wash. 2d
246, 407 P.2d 440 (1965). Washington also waived immunity by statute. WASH.REV.
CODEANN.!$$ 4.92.010-.I70 (1962 & Supp. 1978). I t has maintained the discretionary
acts exception through case law. Hosea v. Seattle, 64 Wash. 2d 678, 393 P.2d 967 (1964);
Loger v. Washington Timber Prods., Inc., 8 Wash. App. 921, 509 P.2d 1009 (1973). North
Carolina has waived sovereign immunity and has established the North Carolina Industrial Commission as a court to hear and determine tort claims against state agencies.
N.C. GEN.STAT.$5 143-291 to 300.6 (1978). Arizona extinguished sovereign immunity in
Stone v. Arizona Highway Comm., 93 Ariz. 384, 381 P.2d 107 (1963). ARIZ.REV.STAT.5
12-821 (1956) provides the mechanism for filing negligence claims against the state and
state entities. Grimm v. Arizona Bd. of Pardons and Paroles, 115 Ariz. 260, 564 P.2d
1227 (1977).
For a general discussion of governmental immunity of state and local officials, see 57
AM.JUR. 2d Negligence $5 54,79,91,243,321,322 (1971); Annot., 60 A.L.R.2d 11 (1958);
Annot., 163 A.L.R. 1435 (1946); Annot., 120 A.L.R. 1376 (1939); Kovnat, Torts: Sovereign and Governmental Immunity in New Mexico, 6 N.M.L. REV.249 (1976); Comment,
The Colorado Governmental Immunity Act: A Prescription for Regression, 49 DEN.L.J.
567 (1973); Comment, The Colorado Governmental Immunity Act: A Judicial Challenge
and the Legislative Response, 44 U. COLO.L. REV.449 (1972).
213. UTAHCODEANN.$8 63-48-1 to 7 (1953).
214. See, e.g., COLO.REV.STAT.5 24-10-110 (1973); N.M. STAT.ANN.5 41-4-4 (1978);
OR.REV.STAT.5 30.285 (1977); WASH.REV.CODEANN.$5 4.92.010-.I70 (1962 & Supp.
1978).
215. UTAHCODEANN.5 63-48-3(4) (1953). The law is similar in New Mexico in both
ANN.55 32-1-25, 41-4-4 (1978).
respects. See N.M. STAT.
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ble of precise definition,"' the very significant danger of substantial harm to children from incarceration in adult jails may
well qualify such confinement as gross negligence on the part of
the officials responsible.

Though humanitarians have warned for more than a century of its potential adverse effects, children are still incarcerated in adult jails throughout the United States. The promise of
the Juvenile Justice and Delinquency Prevention Act of 1974
has been carried forward with only limited enforcement. While
children sit in dark, dirty cells, the prey of nearby adult inmates,
local and state officials complain about the shrinking tax base
and the inconvenience of reassigning law officers for transportation duties.
In this unconscionable situation, children and their legal advocates must press for vigorous enforcement of state and federal
laws prohibiting the confinement of juveniles in adult jails. From
the foregoing discussion, it is evident that local and state officials, particularly sheriffs and county commissioners, are subject
to lawsuits for declaratory and injunctive relief, as well as damages. The executive and legislative branches of government have
contented themselves with an attitude of benign neglect. Only
by bringing the flagrant abuses of children's rights to the attention of the courts will children and their advocates effect meaningful and lasting change.

216. See PROSSER,
HANDBOOK
OF THE LAW
OF TORTS
183-84 (4th ed. 1971).

